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ESSAY
BANK RESOLUTION IN THE EUROPEAN
BANKING UNION: A TRANSATLANTIC
PERSPECTIVE ON WHAT IT WOULD TAKE
Jeffrey N. Gordon* & Wolf-Georg Ringe**
The project of creatinga Banking Union is designed to overcome
the fatal link between sovereigns and their banks in the Eurozone. As
part of this project, political agreement for a common supervision
framework and a common resolution scheme has been reached with
difficulty. However, the resolution framework is weak, underfunded
and exhibits some serious flaws. Further, Member States'
disagreements appear to rule out a federalized deposit insurance
scheme, commonly regarded as the necessary third pillar of a
successful Banking Union.
This paper argues for an organizational and capital structure
substitute for these two shortcomings that can minimize the systemic
distress costs of the failure of a largefinancial institution. We borrow
from the approach the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
has devised in the implementation of the "Orderly Liquidation
Authority" under the Dodd-Frank Act. The FDIC's experience teaches
us three important lessons: First, systemically important financial
institutions need to have in their liability structure sufficient unsecured
(or otherwise subordinated) term debt so that in the event of bank
failure, the conversion of debt into equity will be sufficient to absorb
asset losses without impairing deposits and other short term credit;
second, the organizationalstructure of the financialinstitution needs to
permit such a debt conversion without putting core financial
constituents through a bankruptcy or other resolution process; and
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third, a federalfunding mechanism deployable at the discretion of the
resolution authority must be available to supply liquidity to a
reorganizingbank. On these conditions, a viable and realisticBanking
Union would be within reach-and the resolution of global financial
institutions would be greatly facilitated, not least in a transatlantic
perspective.
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INTRODUCTION

The European Union (E.U.) is currently assembling the components of a Banking Union, mostly in order to break the close link
between banks and their sovereigns, which proved almost deadly during
the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis and the follow-on Eurozone
sovereign debt and banking crisis during 2010-2013. The creation of the
Banking Union has been described as a "revolution" and the "most
ambitious project since the creation of the euro."' Yet the project is
fraught with difficulties, and initial enthusiasm is long gone. Although
the prevailing view holds that an effective Banking Union requires three
pillars-supervision, resolution, and deposit guarantee-the current
political situation suggests that all three pillars are unlikely to be
achieved. Agreement for a common supervision framework has been
reached with some difficulty, but agreement on a centralized bank resolution mechanism was much more complicated than anticipated. In
particular, the funding of the resolution mechanism proved to be very
controversial, and the outcome jeopardizes the credibility of its operation. Further, some E.U. Member States have made it clear that they are
scheme,
not at all willing to support calls for a joint deposit guarantee
2
and the third pillar has now been dropped accordingly.
This Essay uses a transatlantic perspective on bank resolution,
drawing from the peculiar U.S. financial history, legislation, and
administrative experience of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), to suggest a way to make resolution in the European Banking
Union credible. The key insight this Essay contributes to the debate is to
suggest an approach to resolution that is similar to the FDIC's implementation strategy under the Dodd-Frank Act. This strategy has two main
ingredients: first, to apply a single-point-of-entry (SPOE) approach to
large financial institutions organized in holding company form, and
second, to combine this with the authority to subject unsecured term
debt at the holding company level to bail-in powers. Thus, serious losses
1. Michel Barnier, Eur. Comm'r for Internal Mkts. and Servs., The EU and US: Leading
Partners in Financial Reform, Speech at the Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ. 3 (June 13,
2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-SPEECH-14-465_en.htm?locale=en
[hereinafter Barnier, The EU and US] (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
2. John O'Donnell & Tom K6rkemeier, Europe Strikes Deal to Complete Banking
Union, Reuters (Mar. 20, 2014, 1:57 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/20/
eu-bankingunion-idUSL6NOMH1ZM20140320 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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at operating subsidiaries can be moved upstream to the holding company, where they are absorbed first by the write-down of equity and then
by unsecured term debt. The result is a so-called bail-in, imposing losses
on creditors, that avoids a taxpayer bailout.
This approach would have three major advantages over the current
state of play.
(1) First, this proposal would advance the overall objective of the
Banking Union by making the resolution pillar credible even where the
sovereign is weak. In essence, what we are proposing is mandatory selfinsurancefor systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) instead
of recourse to limited state resources. If a SIFI has, in its liability
structure, sufficient subordinated term debt, in the event of bank failure
the conversion of debt into equity will be sufficient to absorb asset losses
without impairing deposits and other short-term credit. The advantage of
targeting resolution at the holding company level is that the operating
subsidiaries of the banking group can carry on and will not be disrupted,
and the risk of destabilizing runs by short-term creditors will be
minimized.
(2) The second advantage is that a banking resolution pillar
strengthened in this way would make the Banking Union operational
without needing to rely on the third pillar, deposit guarantee. That is,
our concept of self-insurance would make the Banking Union altogether
less dependent on state insurance. As we noted previously, the current
political situation in Europe means that a full-fledged Banking Union
with all three pillars is extremely unlikely, in particular due to resistance
from Germany. Furthermore, recent policy documents no longer refer to
the deposit guarantee pillar. In this political deadlock, a self-insurance
resolution mechanism would overcome the sensitive issue of mutualization of debt.' From a political economy perspective, a proposal that
requires SIFIs to self-insure against failure should also be much easier to
achieve than an expensive state-financed resolution process, let alone a
bailout program.
(3) Finally, a self-insured SIFI resolution mechanism along the lines
we suggest should make it possible for financial institutions to be
resolved successfully even on a global stage. The SPOE approach concentrates the resolution mechanism at the parent company level, avoiding
the need for resolution of diverse national subsidiaries and thus avoiding
the disruptive disintegration of a cross-border financial institution.
Regulators worldwide have confirmed that they prefer the SPOE strategy
over its post-crisis competitor, the multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE)
3. A deposit insurance fund pools the risk of bank failure and covers depositor
losses at a failed bank by premiums contributed by other banks. Risk is thus "mutualized."
Some think of this as a form of cross-subsidy. Unsecured term debt at the holding
company level protects depositors of a failed subsidiary bank through a form of selfinsurance.
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approach. The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), a
banking watchdog, has recently stated its preference for the SPOE
system,4 as have the German BaFin 5 and the Bank of England and the
FDIC in a joint statement. 6 The alternative MPOE approach would
require cooperation and joint action of several regulators, which would
create information problems and follow-up costs: Essentially, the SIFI
would fragment during a resolution process. If regulators worldwide
could agree on SPOE as a global standard, the current pressure by U.S.
regulators for foreign banks to operate in the United States through
7
intermediate holding companies might well be relaxed.
This paper is organized as follows. Part I describes the current
efforts in Europe to create a Banking Union and demonstrates the
politically uncertain future of all three pillars. Policymakers face the
critical questions of whether the newly adopted resolution mechanism
can credibly introduce market discipline and whether a two-pillar
Banking Union-consisting only of common supervision and resolution
but not deposit guarantee-can operate satisfactorily in practice.
Part II then turns to U.S. developments to suggest an institutional
alternative. We explain the rise of deposit insurance as the resolution
backstop for SIFIs and the way its limits were exposed by the financial
crisis. Consequently, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act put in place "Orderly
Liquidation Authority" (OLA), a resolution mechanism for SIFIs administered by the FDIC. OLA transcends deposit insurance in two important
ways. First, Title I covers nondepository institutions as well as banks.
Second, an explicit legislative goal was to force creditors to realize losses in
resolving the particular failed institution, rather than mutualizing such
losses through use of a deposit insurance fund.

4. FINMA, Resolution of Global Systemically Important Banks: FINMA Position
Paper on Resolution of G-SIBS 3 (2013), available at http://www.finma.ch/e/finma/
publikationen/Documents/pos-sanierung-abwicklung-201 30807-e.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
5. See MartinJ. Gruenberg, Chairman, FDIC, Remarks to the Volcker Alliance Program
10 (Oct. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Gruenberg, Remarks to the Volcker Alliance Program],
available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2013/spoctl3l3.hnl
(on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
6. FDIC & Bank of Eng., Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial
Institutions 1 (2012), available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/2012/gsifi.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
7. See Fed. Reserve Sys., Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding Companies
and Foreign Banking Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 17,240, 17,242 (Mar. 27, 2014) (codified in 12
C.ER. § 252.153) (discussing intermediate holding company requirement for large foreign
banks); Daniel K Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Regulating Large
Foreign Banking Organizations, Remarks at the Harvard Law School Symposium on Building
the Financial System of the Twenty-First Century: An Agenda for Europe and the United States
13 (Mar. 27, 2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
tarullo20140327a.htm [hereinafter Tarullo, Regulating Large Foreign Banking Organizations]
(on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (same).
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Part III explains how the FDIC, in its implementation of OLA, has
planned an implicit bail-in strategy that imposes losses on unsecured
term creditors while protecting depositors and all other short-term credit
providers without recourse to the deposit insurance fund. The FDIC's
strategy is facilitated by the holding company structure that characterizes
large U.S. financial institutions. Upon the imminent failure of a SIFI, the
FDIC would initiate an OLA proceeding through a "single point of
entry," putting only the holding company ("Topco") into receivership.
This makes it possible to avoid resolution or a disruptive bankruptcy for
all subsidiaries, including banks and foreign affiliates. It would thus be
easier to protect short-term creditors, including uninsured depositors,
who typically are claimants at the operating subsidiary level. Topco (or its
immediate successor, "Bridgeco") would then be recapitalized through
conversion of its unsecured term debt into equity; its liquidity needs
would be satisfied through advances funded by the FDIC's borrowing
from the U.S. Treasury and through the FDIC's guarantee of obligations
issued by the reorganizing entity. The effectiveness of such a resolution
strategy would require prior regulation of the holding company balance
sheet, to assure a sufficiently thick layer of unsecured term debt.
This structure has a double genius: First, a large financial institution
can be resolved in a way that minimizes own-firm losses as well as otherfirm contagion deriving from the resolution itself. This is because the
structure mitigates run-risk that leads to fire sale asset dispositions and
avoids operating subsidiary disruption that erodes franchise value.
Second, with this structure in place, a large financial institution can be
resolved, and depositors protected, without recourse to the deposit insurance fund. This is because deposits will be senior to the subordinated
term debt, the conversion of which into equity will absorb losses. Note
that anticipated minimization of own-firm losses will reduce the thickness
of the term debt cushion necessary to make the resolution successful. In
short, the U.S. experience teaches that deposit insurance is neither
sufficient nor necessary for successful resolution of a large financial firm.
Part IV briefly explores the history of U.S. banking organization;
specifically, it explores how the holding company structure of significant
financial institutions became the common pattern. Evolution of European
financial firms to a similar pattern would enable use of the FDIC's SPOE
approach.
The paper subsequently returns to Europe and applies the insights
from the U.S. context. Part V briefly describes the strategies that have
been employed by E.U. Member States to address failing banks,
including the newly adopted E.U. directive on bank resolution8 and, for

8. This is known as the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. Directive 2014/59,
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 Establishing a Framework
for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and
Amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC,
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systemically important banks, the newly created set-up for a Single
Resolution Mechanism (SRM).9 These proposals and plans are then
evaluated against a proposal modeled on the FDIC's approach under
OLA.
Part VI applies the fruit of our comparative focus to propose how the
SRM can become more effective operationally, making the "resolution" a
more credible disciplinary device and thus strengthening the Banking
Union. Drawing on the U.S. experience, this Essay argues for (i) a capital
structure for European SIFIs that includes sufficient unsecured term
debt so that a "bail-in" resolution can provide a form of self-insurance of
bank deposits and (ii) reorganization of systemically important European
financial firms into holding companies that would facilitate SPOE resolution strategies. These elements are complementary, because the reorganization proposal facilitates effective use of the bail-in resolution strategy.
We then chart a path through the existing European institutional framework that would make this approach possible.
I. THE PLANS FOR CREATING A EUROPEAN BANKING UNION

This Part describes the establishment of a "European Banking
Union," initially comprising three pillars-supervision, resolution, and
deposit guarantee. This remarkable project can be understood only by
appreciating the problems European banks faced during the Global
Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 and then the follow-on Eurozone sovereign
debt and banking crisis of 2010-2013.
The failure of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008 triggered the
acute phase of what is commonly regarded as the worst financial crisis
since the Great Depression. Lehman's bankruptcy led to a multifaceted
run that quickly froze credit markets. Banks faced large losses, realized
and unrealized, across diverse asset classes, especially real estate. The
crisis imperiled financial institutions worldwide, especially in the United
States and the E.U., whose financial sectors were most closely linked. In
most cases, the response of governments was to bail out their banks with
taxpayers' money, bowing to a well-placed fear of generalized financial
sector collapse that would debilitate the real economy. In the United
States, for example, Congress anted up $700 billion through the Troubled
Assets Relief Program; the FDIC provided loan guarantees to financial
institutions of up to $1.5 trillion; the U.S. Treasury guaranteed money

2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU,
and Regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010 and (EU) No. 648/2012, of the European
Parliament and of the Council, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 190 [hereinafter BRRD].
9. Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 15 July 2014 Establishing Uniform Rules and a Uniform Procedure for the Resolution
of Credit Institutions and Certain Investment Firms in the Framework of a Single
Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and Amending Regulation (EU) No.
1093/2010, 2014 O.J. (L 225) 1 [hereinafter SRM Regulation].
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market funds with outstanding obligations of $3.5 trillion; and the Federal
Reserve created multiple liquidity facilities (with generous collateral conditions) with potential commitments of up to $7 trillion. Upon the U.S.
Treasury's successful implementation of credible bank stress tests, the
financial crisis ended in the United States in March 2009.10
The European response to the crisis has been a play in two acts."
Act One was the immediate post-Lehman rescue of national banks by
Member States. Act Two is the ongoing sovereign debt/banking crisis
that particularly affects the Eurozone. Throughout, the E.U. has faced
two distinct problems that interact. First, credit intermediation in Europe
is heavily bank-based; a consequence is that banking assets (by country) are a
multiple of national GDP, so that rescuing the banking sector through
national guarantees seemed likely to exceed the fiscal capacity for some
Member States.1 2 Second, zero risk-weighting under the Basel rules for
OECD sovereign debt and implicit sovereign debt guarantees associated
with the European Monetary Union encouraged banks prior to the
financial crisis to add sovereign assets. 1" As the crisis unfolded, mounting
evidence of bad (private) assets on bank balance sheets made it more
likely that explicit and implicit state guarantees would be called upon,

10. For a general account, see Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting
Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance
Fund, 28 YaleJ. Reg. 151, 164-66 & n.25, 192 n.132 (2011). For an insider's account of the
U.S. Government's response, see generally Timothy Geithner, Stress Test: Reflections on
Financial Crises (2014).
11. In Part V, we describe the particulars of the European response to the financial
crisis, which has moved fitfully from a series of loosely coordinated rescues at the Member
State level to negotiation of the Banking Union.
12. See Alberto Gallo et al., The Revolver: RBS Macro Credit Research, European
Banks: Still Too Big to Fail 9-10 (2014), available at http://static.presspeople.com/
attachment/cd8316b272864aacaf2161ef83016d09 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(noting European banks' assets are roughly 3.2 times GDP and "[m]any are larger than
the sovereign they are based in, measured as total assets/GDP"); see also High-Level
Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector, Final Report 11-19,
39-41, 119 (2012) [hereinafter Liikanen Report], available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/bank/docs/high-level-expert group/report.en.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (explaining how growth in E.U. banking sector leading up to crisis
"significantly outpaced EU GDP growth").
13. Banks are required to set aside capital for risky assets against the possibility of losses.
Under the applicable conventions, sovereign debt issued by OECD countries was deemed to
carry "zero" risk, and thus not to require a capital set-aside. Markets appreciated that such sovereign debt was risky, however, and required incremental interest. Thus, banks could increase
profitability by holding sovereign debt. In effect, the zero-risk weighting meant that banks
could increase their leverage. See Daniel Gros, Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus: The
Self-Serving Treatment of Sovereign Debt, Intereconomics, Mar./Apr. 2013, at 93, 94
(arguing for increase in risk weights); Viral V. Archarya & Sascha Steffen, The "Greatest"
Carry Trade Ever? Understanding Eurozone Bank Risks 33-34, 39 (NBER, Working Paper
No. 19039, 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19039.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
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which eroded the safety of sovereign debt.14 In turn, increasing sovereign
default risk eroded the quality of bank balance sheets heavily laden with
sovereign debt, raising the specter of bank insolvency. Banks pulled back
from lending to fortify their balance sheets; the resulting credit rationing
fed economic contraction, which damaged national fiscal stability because of reductions of tax receipts and increases in stabilizing transfer
payments. Such fiscal imbalances heightened sovereign credit risk. Banks
and sovereigns in the E.U. were linked in a destructive spiral. The establishment of the European Banking Union was a desperate effort to sever
that link. 15
Ever since the initial wave of state interventions in Fall 2008,
academics, regulators, and policymakers have deplored the lack of alternatives to the bailout programs, pressing for the adoption of restructuring tools that could "resolve" a large failing bank or other financial
institution without wreaking havoc across the financial sector. 1 6 Additionally, the collapse of Lehman Brothers U.K. after the failure of Lehman
Brothers U.S., as well as the failure of Fortis Bank, underscored the need
to create cross-border resolution options.' 7 As we will elaborate below,
the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act has given the FDIC powers for orderly resolution of systemically important financial institutions; in turn, the FDIC has
devised an approach that may address cross-border problems as well.
In Europe, the first round of activity took place at the national level,
reflected most prominently in new bank resolution regimes adopted in

14. The most obvious case was Ireland, but the problem generalized as the crisis wore
on. See Eur. Comm'n, Representation in Ireland, http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/key-eupolicy-areas/economy/index en.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated
Nov. 18, 2014) (discussing sovereign debt issues associated with financial collapse in
Ireland and how the sovereign financial crisis spread to rest of E.U.).
15. For an account of the European financial crisis, see Liikanen Report, supra note
12, at 4-11, 21-22, 24-31; see also Eur. Comm'n, The Financial and Economic Crisis,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/explained/the-financial-and-economiccrisis/w
hy-did the-crisishappen/index en.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
updated Apr. 9, 2014) (providing high-level overview of crisis).
16. A prominent proponent was Ben Bernanke, then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve.
See Oversight of the Federal Government's Intervention at American International Group:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), available at
http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/I11/1l-20.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) ("AIG highlights the urgent need for new resolution
procedures for systemically important, nonbank financial firms.").
17. Fortis Bank had operations in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The
problems that arose from the inconsistent objectives of the national regulators are
described in Zdenek Kudrna, Cross-Border Resolution of Failed Banks in the European
Union After the Crisis: Business As Usual, 50 J. Comm. Mkt. Stud. 283, 288-90 (2012). See
also infra text accompanying note 126. Some can claim prescience in seeing urgency for
new resolution regimes. See Robert R. Bliss, Resolving Large Complex Financial
Organizations, in Market Discipline in Banking: Theory and Evidence 3, 4-5 (George G.
Kaufman ed., 2003) (advocating, in 2003, for study of large-bank failure resolution).
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the U.K. and Germany.1 8 After an extended period of deliberation, the E.U.
has now agreed on a common instrument for recovery and resolution of
banks, effectively harmonizing the (national) resolution powers across E.U.
Member States, the "Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive" (BRRD). 19
This instrument introduces mandatory standards for all existing resolution
mechanisms throughout the E.U. Member States but leaves resolution
authority and funding in the hands of the Member States.
Under pressure of the Eurozone's ongoing sovereign debt/bank
crisis, in June 2012 the E.U. Member States and institutions agreed in
principle to create a Eurozone Banking Union. 2' The agreement opened
up an entirely new dimension for cross-border banking resolution, as the
second element of the three pillars of the proposed Banking Unionjoint supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance-would create federal resolution powers to be wielded by a new E.U. resolution authority
given access to a new federal rescue fund. Under its current design, the
Banking Union is primarily a framework for the Eurozone but is open for
all other E.U. Member States as well. The key rationale for federalizing
these powers is to strengthen an unbiased, neutral approach to bank
oversight and resolution, thus mitigating forbearance and moral hazard,
and to break the fatal link between sovereigns and their banks.21
The first step has been the creation of a Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM) for Eurozone banks, in which the European Central
Bank (ECB) has been given the additional mandate of supervising all
"significant" Eurozone banks. 22 Vivid demonstration of both the novelty
18. For an overview of various policy responses until 2011, see Basel Comm. on
Banking Supervision, Resolution Policies and Frameworks-Progress So Far (2011),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs200.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
19. BRRD, supra note 8.
20. European Council 28/29June 2012 Conclusions, 2012 O.J. (C 76) 1.
21. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council Establishing Uniform Rules and a Uniform Procedure for the Resolution of
Credit Institutions and Certain Investment Firms in the Framework of a Single Resolution
Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and Amending Regulation (EU) No.
1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, at 2, 7, COM (2013) 520 final
(July 10, 2013) [hereinafter SRM Proposal] (noting "the establishment of the Single
Supervisory Mechanism ensures a level playing field in the supervision of banks and
diminishes the risk of forbearance" and is "a crucial step... to ease funding conditions
for vulnerable sovereigns and banks and break the link between the two"); SRM
Regulation, supra note 9, at 3 ("The establishment of the SRM will ensure a neutral
approach in dealing with failing banks and therefore increase stability of the banks ....).
22. A bank is deemed "significant" when it meets one of the following five conditions: (1)
the "total value of its assets exceeds C30 billion"; (2) the value of its assets exceeds both C5
billion and 20% of its state GDP; (3) the bank is among the "three most significant" banks
"established in a Member State"; (4) the bank conducts significant cross-border activities
relative to its total assets/liabilities; (5) the bank receives assistance from a Eurozone
bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism. Eur. Cent. Bank, Guide to Banking
Supervision 8 (2014) [hereinafter ECB, Guide to Banking Supervision], available at
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssmguidebankingsupevision2Ol4l
1.en.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Overall, at present, 130 banks are subject to
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and the urgency of the Banking Union project is reflected by the timeline for approval and implementation of the SSM. The Banking Union
was agreed to in June 2012; the European Commission's initial proposal
on SSM came in September 2012;21 the Member States reached final
agreement in 2013;24 and the ECB took up its supervisory duties in
November 2014.25

ECB supervision, representing about 80% of all banks' assets. See Eur. Cent. Bank,
Comprehensive Assessment (Oct. 26, 2014), https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/
banking/comprehensive/html/index.en.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The
Banking Union primarily addresses the Eurozone countries, but other non-Euro E.U. Member
States can sign up for it. On the SSM, see the speech byJ6rg Asmussen, Member, Exec. Bd. of
the Eur. Cent. Bank, Speech Before the Atlantic Council: Building Banking Union (July 9,
2013) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Nicolas Wron, Europe's Single
Supervisory Mechanism and the Long Journey Towards Banking Union, Bruegel Policy
Contribution, Oct. 2012, at 1, 5 ("The proposal suggests that the geographical perimeter of the
SSM is the euro area, and adds the possibility of 'close supervisory cooperation' for those noneuro area member states that desire it.").
23. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Conferring Specific Tasks on the
European Central Bank Concerning the Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of
Credit Institutions, COM (2012) 511 final (Sept. 12, 2012) [hereinafter European
Commission, SSM Proposal]. Alongside this, the Commission also proposed another
regulation to adapt the rules governing the European Banking Authority (EBA).
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory
Authority (European Banking Authority) as Regards Its Interaction with Council
Regulation (EU) No. _/- Conferring Specific Tasks on the European Central Bank
Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions, COM
(2012) 512 final (Sept. 12, 2012) [hereinafter European Commission, Proposal to Amend
EBA Rules]; see also Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, An Important Step Towards a Real
Banking Union in Europe: Statement by Commissioner Michel Barnier Following the
Trilogue Agreement on the Creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism for the
Eurozone (Mar. 19, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-13-251_en.pdf
[hereinafter Barnier Press Release] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (announcing
"essential step" of "major legislative package" of SSM and EBA). The Council gave its final
blessing in October 2013. See Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council
Approves
Single
Supervisory
Mechanism
for
Banking
(Oct.
15,
2013),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms.Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/139012.p
df (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("The Council today adopted regulations
creating a single supervisory mechanism for the oversight of banks and other credit
institutions, thus establishing one of the main elements of Europe's banking union.").
24. The final package consists of two instruments: Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 Oct. 2013 Conferring Specific Tasks on
the European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of
Credit Institutions, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 63 [hereinafter SSM Regulation], and Regulation (EU)
No. 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013
Amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority
(European Banking Authority) as Regards the Conferral of Specific Tasks on the European
Central Bank Pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 5
[hereinafter Regulation Amending EBA Rules].
25. For detailed guidance on how the ECB will implement its supervisory duties, see
generally ECB, Guide to Banking Supervision, supra note 22.
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The second pillar, the Single Resolution Mechanism, proved more
controversial and uncertain. The European Commission's initial proposal for creation of the SRM came in July 2013.26 This proposal was met
with fierce political criticism, and its constitutional feasibility under the
current European Treaty framework was unclear for quite some time. 27 It
took months of contentious negotiation before the SRM was adopted in
July 2014.28 The SRM is accompanied by an Intergovernmental
Agreement (IGA) between the Member States that specifically creates a
"Single Bank Resolution Fund. '2 9 From the perspective of this paper, the
significance of the SRM lies in its fundamental departure from a parallel
post-crisis enactment, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.
Whereas the BRRD harmonizes national resolution mechanisms and
improves the coordination between them, the rationale of bank resolution under a Banking Union means that it becomes centralized.This is an
essential part of the Banking Union: It endeavors to ensure impartial
decisionmaking on how to deal with failed banks on the European level,
thus reducing any possibility of national forbearance. 30 Moreover, the
Union aims to better deal with cross-border bank failures.' The final text
of the SRM Regulation will be discussed in detail below.
26. SRM Proposal, supra note 21.
27. See Quentin Peel & Alex Barker, Berlin Rejects Brussels' Attempt to Grabbing
Power to Shut Banks, Fin. Times (July 10, 2013, 8:17 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/O/ad8cfe12-e982-11e2-9fll-00144feabdc0.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting Germany attacked European Commission "for overstepping its legal
powers with a proposal to make itself the top authority for winding up eurozone banks").
The constitutional problems, which related to the limits on the European Commission's
ability to delegate its authority to administrative bodies, appear to be mitigated by the
recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision endorsing the role of the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in prohibiting certain aspects of short selling.
Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, at
27-119 (Jan. 22, 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=146621&page
Index=O&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=l&cid=12829
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
28. SRM Regulation, supra note 9, at 1.
29. Council Agreement 8457/14, Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation of
Contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (2014) available at http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%208457%202014%20INIT; see also infra notes
209-210 and accompanying text (describing agreement).
30. Cf. Gary B. Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don't See Them
Coming 176 (2012) (noting how "[florbearance typically results in even greater losses"
than bank runs).
31. SRM Proposal, supra note 21, at 3-5; see also Opinion of the European Central Bank
on a Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing
Uniform Rules and a Uniform Procedure for the Resolution of Credit Institutions and Certain
Investment Firms in the Framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank
Resolution Fund and Amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European
Parliament and of the Council, 2013 O.J. (C 76) 2, 3 (opining single resolution authority
"is better placed to guarantee optimal resolution action.., than a network of national
resolution authorities," because "[c]oordination between national resolution systems has
not proved sufficient. . . in a cross-border context").
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The third pillar, a joint deposit guarantee scheme, now seems
abandoned. 2 Soon after plans for the Banking Union were announced,
strenuous objections to joint deposit insurance, particularly from
Germany, forced the Banking Union designers to give up on this element. 3 Media reports suggest that the European Commission, when
putting forth the proposals for the SSM, had planned to publish simul34
taneously a detailed roadmap to a European deposit insurance fund.
But the document appeared only briefly on the Commission's website
and was deleted after a few hours due to complaints from Berlin that it
was premature and unrealistic.35 Instead, it was condensed to a short
"next steps" page, which referred only vaguely to the need to develop a
common bank resolution plan and barely mentioned a deposit guarantee
scheme at all." The episode underlines the deep-seated resistance to
some of the elements of the Banking Union plans in Germany (and
other countries), where a joint deposit guarantee scheme is interpreted
as requiring Northern European taxpayers to underwrite the losses of
s7
Southern depositors.
The Banking Union represents a major shift in attitude toward
integration for European financial regulation. The threat to the
Eurozone project from the sovereign debt and banking crisis that began
in 2010 overwhelmed the initial opposition from some of the economically strong Northern European countries. What was once contested was
eventually seen as necessary. The bottom line, however, is that a future
Banking Union will rest on two legs at most, instead of three. Only the
first leg (supervision) is comparatively solid, whereas the second leg
(resolution) appears to be a weak compromise. The third leg will probably never come: Recent E.U. documents scarcely reference the deposit

32. For a more optimistic view, see Eilis Ferran, European Banking Union: Imperfect,
But It Can Work 3 (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 30/2014, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2426247 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) ("Some form of common system for deposit protection (DGS) is also
intended but not immediately.").
33. See Alex Barker, Brussels Shelved Bank Deposit Scheme, Fin. Times (Sept. 13, 2012,
5:51 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/e2ddl2ec-fdbe-Ilel-9901-OO144feabdcO.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("German objections forced Brussels to shelve an
ambitious blueprint for a single guarantee scheme .... laying bare the political obstacles
facing a full banking union.").
34. E.g., id.
35. Id.
36. The FinancialTimes reported that the Commission had intended "to propose a
new agency, the European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (Edira), which
would control a new European Deposit Guarantee and Resolution Fund (Edgar)." Id.
Edira would then replace national deposit guarantee arrangements. Id.
37. Id.
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guarantee plan,3 8 and regulators are devising
plans to make the Banking
3 9
Union work without joint deposit guarantee.
The question is whether the European Banking Union can stand as
a one-and-a-half-legged stool. After all, various experts have asserted the
necessity of a "fully-fledged" banking union with "all three pillars."4
The next sections offer a transatlantic perspective on how a resolution
authority could be improved to operate effectively, and how it could
even do so without ajoint deposit guarantee scheme.
II.

THE U.S. PATFERN OF RESOLUTION: DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND THE PATH

TO "ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY"

Deposit insurance in the United States evolved from a way to protect
small depositors at small banks to an integral part of a resolution process
that, in the case of large banks, commonly protected-or "bailed out"all depositors, whether or not insured. The rationales for these bailouts
were, variously, that the bailouts would be self-funding, that they would
minimize community impact of failed financial institutions, and ultimately, that they would mitigate systemic risk. This practice failed during
the financial crisis for two somewhat distinct reasons: First, the initial
source of systemic distress was the failure of nonbank institutions that
were beyond the resolution authority of the FDIC. Second, depository
institutions-the banks-were themselves such large, complex institutions, and so tied up with nonbanking affiliates, that the losses might

38. For example, the recent SRM proposal no longer mentions a single deposit
guarantee mechanism, but refers to (harmonized) national schemes only. SRM Proposal,
supra note 21, at 3, 15.
39. For example, in a recent speech, Vftor ConstAncio, Vice-President of the ECB,
signaled that the Banking Union would have to live without a single deposit guarantee
scheme for the near future. He emphasized the strengthening of local (but harmonized)
rules for deposit insurance, which "should help shore up confidence in national
schemes .... This means that a single European scheme is not an essential component of
Banking Union in the short term." Vftor Constdncio, Vice President, Eur. Cent. Bank, The
Nature and Significance of Banking Union, Speech at the Conference "Financial Regulation:
Towards a
Global
Regulatory
Framework?"
(Mar.
11,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2013/html/spl30311.en.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
40. See, e.g., Wron, supra note 22, at 3 ("A fully-fledged banking union [beyond the
SSM] requires an autonomous European resolution authority and a federal European
deposit insurance system, both of which require some sufficient form of backstop from a
European level of fiscal authority to acquire credibility.)"; Benoit Cceur6, Member, Exec.
Bd., Eur. Cent. Bank, Why the Euro Needs a Banking Union, Speech at the Conference "Bank
Funding-Markets, Instruments and Implications for Corporate Lending and the Real
Economy" (Oct. 8, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/
html/sp121008_1.en.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("[W]e need to
construct a banking union... , an institutional framework which ultimately should have
three legs: a single supervisory mechanism (SSM), a common resolution structure and a
shared deposit insurance.").
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have swamped the Deposit Insurance Fund had the FDIC decided
via the
"systemic risk" exception that it could offer protective assistance. 4'
The U.S. government responded with the Dodd-Frank Act, which,
inter alia, instituted an "Orderly Liquidation Authority" (OLA) to
address both of these issues. First, OLA provides a resolution mechanism
for all SIFIs, not just banks, thereby closing gaps in coverage. Second, the
OLA provisions are clear on the point that "creditors are to bear losses,"
thus rejecting the bailout expectancy and statutorily preventing potential
42
exhaustion of the Deposit Insurance Fund.
Thus framed, an OLA regime would not necessarily succeed in
preventing systemic distress from the failure of a large financial institution. This is because a regime organized around the principle of "no
more bail-outs"/"creditors bear losses" may exacerbate an important
vector of systemic risk-run risk on the part of large, uninsured depositors and other providers of short-term credit (such as money market
mutual funds). In anticipation of the possibility of losses, uninsured depositors may withdraw funds and short-term creditors may simply refuse
to roll over maturing obligations. This will trigger the immediate need
for financially stressed banks to shrink their balance sheet to match the
corresponding fall off in funding, which is likely to produce "fire sale"
dispositions of existing assets, "liquidity hoarding" throughout the financial sector, and credit rationing to the real economy. Thus, failure at a
single important financial firm rapidly can lead to systemic consequences.
There are three key elements to a resolution of a failing SIFI that
minimize the risk of follow-on systemic distress: First, the reliable transport of short-term credit claims to a new, well-capitalized successor financial institution; second, adequate liquidity support to the successor firm
while it finds its footing; and third, a way to recapitalize that successor
institution that does not require taxpayer support, at a time when equity
markets would be closed to such a possibility. The Dodd-Frank Act gives
41. In 2009, even after injections from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
that protected all the major banks from failure, the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund was
approximately $21 billion in the red. On the eve of the crisis, the fund balance was a record
high of only $52 billion. FDIC, Toward a Long Term Strategy for Deposit Insurance
Management, FDIC Quarterly, Third Quarter 2010, at 29, 30 (2010). When it came time to
rescue Citigroup, $45 billion came directly from TARP funds but an additional $301 billion
came through loss-sharing guarantees; the FDIC limited its "at risk" amount to only $10 billion.
Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Extraordinary Financial
Assistance Provided to Citigroup, Inc. 6, 20 tbl.1 (2011). See also infra note 85 (discussing limit
on FDIC's line of credit with U.S. Treasury).
42. Indeed, the Dodd-Frank Act states that "the authorities of the [FDIC] relating to
the Deposit Insurance Fund... shall not be used to assist a covered financial company
pursuant to the this tite and ...the Deposit Insurance Fund may not be used in manner
to otherwise circumvent the purposes of this title." Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210(n) (8) (A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1507-08
(2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n) (8) (A) (2012)).
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the FDIC the power to establish a successor firm, a "bridge bank,"4 3 and
to supply liquidity support either through lending the proceeds from a
drawdown on a U.S. Treasury credit line or by providing full-faith-andcredit guarantees of bridge-bank debt issuances." Under the FDIC's
OLA implementation procedures, the means of capitalizing the new
financial institution will come through "bail-in": the conversion of longterm unsecured credit claims of the failed SIFI into equity in the new
institution, via administrative action under law.45 In short, instead of
deposit insurance that bailed out the depositors (and sometimes all of
the creditors), the bail-in of longer term unsecured creditors will protect
all the depositors and other short-term creditors. Large depositors and
other short-term credit providers are not "insured" in the literal sense, but
the mechanism of the resolution aims to give them sufficient "assurance" as
to mitigate run risk. "Deposit insurance" becomes "deposit assurance." At
least that is the theory on which the FDIC claims that its OLA procedures
46
can successfully resolve a SIFI without taking down the financial system.
A.

Resolution in the United States

We now turn to unpacking this argument. At the outset, it is important to state the importance of "resolution," as opposed to the "bankruptcy" or "insolvency" alternative for banks and other financial institutions. 47 "Bankruptcy" entails a court-supervised process that is designed
to protect the substantive and procedural rights of all creditors without
particular regard for broader public interests. It entails the immediate
cessation of payments to any particular class of creditors (e.g., depositors
or other short-term funders). It triggers default provisions in various
counterparty credit agreements that may permit the seizing of collateral
and the termination of relationships. It brings an abrupt halt to the

43. Id. § 210(h) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(h)).
44. Id. §§ 210(h) (2) (G) (iv), (n) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5390(h) (2) (G), (n)).
45. See FDIC, Notice and Request for Comments, Resolution of Systemically
Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614,
76,616 (Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter FDIC, Notice, Single Point of Entry] ("[Long-term]
debt in the failed company would be converted into equity that would serve to ensure that
the new operations would be well-capitalized.").
46. See Stephen J. Lubben, Roosevelt Inst., OLA After Single Point of Entry: Has
Anything Changed 1-6 (2013), available at http://rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/
UnfinishedMissionLubbenOLAHas_.AnythingChange.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (summarizing and critiquing FDIC proposal).
47. On the difference between the SPOE strategy and ordinary bankruptcy, see
Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Dodd-Frank for Bankruptcy Lawyers, 19 Am.
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 287, 299-302 (2011) (comparing Chapter 11 bankruptcy process with
Dodd-Frank Title II receivership); David A. Skeel, Jr., Single Point of Entry and the
Bankruptcy Alternative, in Across the Great Divide: New Perspectives on the Financial
Crisis 311, 321-26, 329-33 (Martin Neil Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014), available at
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/across-the-great-divide-chl5.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
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trading in financial claims that is the lifeblood of a financial firm.
Because of the nature of financial assets and relationships in the financial
sector, in the absence of immediate "debtor-in-possession" financing that
would keep the firm afloat and guarantee its undertakings while a reorganization is negotiated, bankruptcy intervention will produce severe
erosion in the franchise value of a failed financial firm and will deepen
the losses for creditors.4" The financial sector conditions that produce
the bankruptcy of a large firm also make it unlikely that other financial
institutions could provide such large-scale financing and guarantees;
instead, they will hoard liquidity. The consequence of bankruptcy, then,
is likely to be "disorderly liquidation," meaning the disposition of assets
at firesale valuations and a value-destructive disassembly of the firm's
business. 49 If the firm is systemically important, particularly if the firm is
highly interconnected with other financial firms, the abrupt cessation of
counterparty relationships, the expectation of large losses, and the
gyrations in asset values will likely produce widespread systemic distress,
which will magnify the losses that would otherwise occur.5°
By contrast, "resolution" is an administrative process in which the
goal is to protect the liquidity needs of short-term creditors, especially
depositors, and to manage financial assets in a way that preserves their
value and the franchise value of the failing institution. 5' A major objective of resolution is to avoid systemic distress in the financial sector, a
social good that may not coincide with the private objective of protecting
the equal treatment or absolute priority of creditor claims.5 2 One critical
element of resolution, at least from a U.S. perspective, is the capacity of
the administrator to offer liquidity to maintain the critical functions of
the financial institution.53 This is operationally equivalent to debtor-inpossession financing but has the advantage of assured availability in
48. See Randall D. Guynn, Are Bailouts Inevitable?, 29 Yale J. on Reg. 121, 137-40
(2012) ("[B]ankruptcy is a slow and deliberate process that is not designed for preserving
systemically important operations critical to the functioning of the economy as a whole.").
49. The value loss includes significant social value, not just private value, because the
assets commonly end up in the hands of parties who are not best positioned to maximize
their value. For example, a loan officer with knowledge of the borrowers will be better
positioned to manage the credit relationships than a hedge fund manager who has
purchased a loan book. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and
Macroeconomics, 25 J. Econ. Persp. 29, 41-43 (2011) (surveying economics literature).
50. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael W. Taylor, Global Bank Regulation:
Principles and Policies 243 (2010) (noting placing large banks into an ordinary
liquidation process would cause "very real economic damage").
51. See John Armour, Making Bank Resolution Credible 7-8 (Univ. of Oxford &
ECGI Law, Working Paper No. 244/20124, Feb. 2014) (forthcoming in Oxford Handbook
of Financial Regulation (Niamh Moloney et al. eds., 2015)), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=2393998 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing original FDIC
resolution model).
52. See Guynn, supra note 48, at 141 (noting Bankruptcy Code does not have goals
of considering "public confidence or systemic risk").
53. See id. at 144.
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sufficient amount at a time of systemic distress. In comparing resolution
under OLA with the outcome of bankruptcy, the FDIC projected that in
the case of Lehman Brothers, an OLA resolution would have produced
losses of only 3 cents on the dollar versus bankruptcy losses of 79 cents
on the dollar.54 In short, the major losses in the failure of a large
financial institution will result from disorderly failure; these losses can be
avoided through an effective resolution process.
To understand the U.S. resolution regime, it makes sense to start
with resolution of a simple bank. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act
creates a special bank resolution procedure that grants the FDIC considerable discretion in addressing a bank failure. 56 One straightforward
way to resolve a failed bank is through a "straight deposit payoff," in
which the FDIC pays off insured deposit claims, takes the failed bank's
assets as receiver, and pays off remaining bank creditors, including
uninsured depositors, from asset dispositions.57 This is not the FDIC's
preferred approach, not just because of the ongoing administrative costs
of the receivership, but also, perhaps more importantly, because of the
loss of the franchise value of the failed institution, including the depositor and lending relationships. 58 Historically the FDIC's favored approach
has been a "purchase and assumption" (P&A) transaction, 59 in which an
acquiring bank purchases assets of the failed bank in exchange for
assuming a certain share of its liabilities and receives FDIC assistance to
cover the gap between the asset values and the liabilities.60 That gap is
funded by the Deposit Insurance Fund.61 Because the entity is preserved
as a going concern, the acquirer will offer a higher price (require less
FDIC assistance) than on a simple asset purchase. The FDIC has the
authority to decide which liabilities (beyond insured deposits) will carry
over to the transferee and therefore be fully protected, but commonly all
54. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Report Examines How an Orderly Resolution of
Lehman Brothers Could Have Been Structured Under the Dodd-Frank Act (Apr. 11,2011)
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/pr11076.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). For a detailed analysis of the Lehman bankruptcy, see generally Michael Fleming
& Asani Sarkar, Fed. Reserve Bank N.Y., The Failure Resolution of Lehman Brothers,
Econ. Policy Rev., Dec. 2014, at 175, available at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/
2014/1412flem.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
55. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 10, at 185-90 (explaining FDIC's original
powers and its struggles regarding large banks).
56. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873 (codified
as amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1835a (2012)).
57. See FDIC, Resolutions Handbook 19 (2014), https://www.fdic.gov/about/
freedom/drr_handbook.pdf [hereinafter FDIC, Resolutions Handbook] (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
58. See id. at 6 ("This resolution option is only executed when the FDIC does not
receive a P&A bid that meets the least cost test.").
59. See id. at 16 (noting "P&A is the most common method used by the FDIC").
60. See id. at 16-17.
61. The Deposit Insurance Fund maintains its reserves by assessing a premium on any
bank wishing to be insured by the Fund. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d) (1).
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deposits-whether or not insured-are carried over, particularly for
larger banks.6 2 In cases where a P&A cannot be immediately arranged,
the FDIC may establish a "bridge bank" and has similar authority over
balance sheet composition in its creation.63
The P&A structure allows considerable flexibility. Not only can
the FDIC allocate assets between its receivership and the acquirer, but
it can transfer assets subject to a loss-sharing arrangement. Loss-sharing
arrangements are particularly useful for large portfolios of troubled
assets of uncertain value. Resolutions are arranged quickly to avoid a run
that would erode the franchise value of the failing bank, meaning that
there is often not time for extensive due diligence, which in any event
could be quite difficult. Depending on market conditions, valuation of
the underlying collateral may be difficult, and a transferee bank may
insist on a lowball price before adding risk to its balance sheet. Taking on
some of this risk may permit the FDIC to realize a considerably higher
price for the transferred assets and thus reduce the overall cost of the
resolution to the Deposit Insurance Fund.
B.

Deposit Insurancein U.S. History

During the last real estate-related banking crisis in the United States,
the savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s, the FDIC was criticized for
excessive protection of uninsured creditors, particularly uninsured
depositors.64 These creditors were almost invariably protected, "bailed
out," even if the failed bank attracted an acquirer. 65 As a result, a 1991
legislative change now requires the FDIC to opt for the "least costly"
resolution transaction-meaning least costly to the Deposit Insurance
Fund-except where otherwise necessary to avoid a systemic distress, a
judgment that requires the concurrence of the Fed and the U.S.
Treasury.66 No large banks failed in the 1991-2007 period, meaning that
62. This is now subject to a "least cost resolution" requirement, which in turn is
subject to a systemic risk exception. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text
(discussing origin of this requirement).
63. See generally FDIC, Resolutions Handbook, supra note 57, at 18-19.
64. See Alan S. Blinder, After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response,
and the Work Ahead 162 (2013) (describing how "Congress had been badly burned by the
S&L crisis" because FDIC had "toss[ed] money around without a compelling reason").
65. See Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis:
Truth and Consequences, FDIC Banking Rev., Dec. 2000, at 26, 30-33, available at
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brvl3n2-2.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing financial outlay from S&L crisis).
66. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, § 141, 105 Star. 2236, 2273-79 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)); see Blinder,
supra note 64, at 162 (describing least-cost resolution requirement); Richard Scott
Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, 12
Ann. Rev. Banking L. 317, 325-26, 352, 363-64 (1993) (same). The "least cost" resolution
requirement did result in a greater incidence of uninsured deposit losses in the event of
bank failure, but the "Great Moderation" of the 1990s and early 2000s meant that the
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the FDIC had no experience in addressing "least cost resolution" issues,
including whether a P&A transaction that transferred uninsured as well
as insured deposits to protect franchise values would produce "least cost"
67
resolution.
Deposit insurance was controversial when it was initially adopted as
part of the New Deal Banking legislation of the early 1930s. 68 At the time,
the U.S. banking system was highly fragmented into relatively few large
money center banks with limited branching and thousands of small local
banks, often confined to a single location, so-called "unit banks." Such
unit banks were exposed to shocks in the local economy, such as a
drought or the closing of a large factory. Private and state-level deposit
insurance schemes had failed at critical moments. The promoters of
deposit insurance (for example, Congressman Henry B. Steagall of
Alabama) regarded deposit insurance as necessary to protect their small
bank constituents from the flow of deposits to larger, more diversified,
more resilient banks.69 Deposit insurance was opposed by the large banks
and by President Roosevelt, who asserted that the program would create
moral hazard.7 ° As part of the legislative compromise, the insured
deposit level was capped at $2,500 (approximately $45,000 in 2013
dollars), a retail level, not a wholesale level.71

subject institutions were relatively small banks. FDIC, Historical Statistics on Banking,
https://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/ (follow "Failures & Assistance Transactions" hyperlink;
select "Effective Date(s)" between 1991 and 2007: select "Insurance Fund" "DIF" as
"Insurance Fund"; select "Produce Report" to arrive at report showing three failures)
[hereinafter FDIC, Historical Statistics].
67. See FDIC, Historical Statistics, supra note 66.
68. On the history of the FDIC, see Charles W. Calomiris & Eugene N. White, The
Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance, in The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach
to Political Economy 145, 145-88 (Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994); Roger
Lowenstein, There's a Reason for Deposit Insurance, N.Y. Times (Mar. 24, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/business/deposit-insurance-and-the-historicalreasons-for-it.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
69. See FDIC, The First Fifty Years: A History of the FDIC 1933-1983, at 38 (1984)
(citing Steagall's support).
70. See id. at 40-43 (discussing opposition to deposit insurance legislation).
71. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 66, sec. 8, § 12B(y), 48 Stat. 162, 179
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1811); Oversight Hearing on "The Federal Deposit
Insurance System and Recommendations for Reform" Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.
& Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (prepared statement of the Hon. Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), http://www.banking.
senate.gov/02-04hrg/042302/gmspan.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing evolution of deposit insurance cap and how deposit insurance both mitigated
and exacerbated systemic risk in run-up to S&L crisis). For an overview of the state of U.S.
banking before the Great Depression and the regulatory response, see Charles W.
Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, Fragile By Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises
and Scarce Credit 187-92 (2014).
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In fact, until banking liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s, moral
hazard because of deposit insurance was not much of a problem. 72 The
applicable regime protected banking rents, which became a self-enforcing
mechanism against excessive risk-taking. The legislative package that
included deposit insurance, the Glass-Steagall Act, also contained provisions for the capping of interest rates on bank deposits, so-called "Reg
73
Q" as well as restrictions on bank affiliation with securities firms.
Because banks could not bid up interest rates to compete for deposits,
banks could generate profits on lower-risk/lower-yielding loans. The preexisting geographic restrictions that limited bank branching also protected
local deposit gathering and loan-making from competitive encroachments.71
It is easy to see how the FDIC moved from "insured deposit protection" to "deposit protection." First, the transactions that protect all deposits, not just insured deposits, are commonly ex post efficient, since
they maximize the going concern value of the transferred entity. Among
other things, imposing losses on depositors probably creates ill will that
would make it hard for an acquirer simply to reopen the failed bank
under a different nameplate. Indeed, preserving the going concern value
by effectively bailing out all depositors may well be the FDIC's least-cost
resolution strategy in many cases. 75 Second, many bank failures arose out
of the exposure of unit banks to local economic shocks, not mismanagement by the local owners. Use of the deposit insurance fund could
efficiently allow the FDIC to protect depositors, mutualize risk, and
guard against insurance abuse. And, as noted above, until the banking
liberalization that began in the 1970s, moral hazard was not a serious
problem. On the few occasions in which large banks were on the verge of
failure, the FDIC stepped in to rescue the distressed bank on the grounds
of systemic harm to the regional or national economy. 76 The most
notorious case was Continental Illinois in 1984, then the seventh largest
bank by assets in the United States, which the FDIC rescued in a trans-

72. See Thomas F. Hellmann ct al., Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and
Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 147, 14849, 162 (2000) (suggesting bank liberalization, including repeal of Regulation O
contributed to moral hazard and increased number of financial crises).
73. Reg Q was promulgated by the Federal Reserve in August 1933 pursuant to § 11
of the Banking Act of 1933 (better known as Glass-Steagall), formerly 12 C.F.R. § 217. For
the history of Regulation Q see generally R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q
What It Did and Why It Passed Away, Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Rev., Feb. 1986, at 22.
74. See generally Richard Scott Carnell, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Law of Banking and Financial Institutions 177-98 (4th ed. 2009) (describing rationale for
geographic restrictions on banks and subsequent geographic expansion).
75. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 10, at 185-86 (discussing effectiveness of P&A
transaction in preserving going concern value).
76. See FDIC, Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC Experience 635-36, 651
(1998).
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action that bailed out creditors of the holding 7company parent as well as
the uninsured depositors of the troubled bank. 1
The traditional FDIC resolution mechanism protects "banks" and
the "banking system," but it does not cover firms that are not banks but
that may be affiliated with banks or that provide systemically important
credit intermediation services as free-standing entities. For example,
although U.S. law does not permit "banks" to underwrite or trade in
nongovernmental securities, the erosion and then outright repeal of
Glass-Steagall in the 1980s and 1990s permitted banks to affiliate with
general broker-dealers through a holding company structure. 78 So, large
U.S. banks became subsidiaries of bank holding companies. The largest
banks created "financial holding companies," which permitted them to
affiliate with any financial service provider. The bank might well be
financed through equity or credit issued by Topco as well as by deposits;
the bank might use deposits to finance some of the activities of the
affiliates (subject to various limits). The consequence was complex
intraorganization credit and equity arrangements. The FDIC's resolution
authority does not run to Topco or the nonbank subsidiaries of Topco.
This problem was revealed in the Continental Illinois case: The FDIC
had only the power to put the bank into an FDIC resolution procedure,
meaning certain default on intraentity debt owed by the bank to the
holding company parent. 7" This in turn would have led to bankruptcy of
the parent, which was not a "bank"; the bankruptcy would have been
handled by the bankruptcy court, not the FDIC. Rather than face the
disruption from the bankruptcy of a significant financial institution, the
FDIC, working with the Federal Reserve, devised a plan that rescued the
parent (including the parent's creditors) as well as the bank.8
The financial crisis forced U.S. regulators to once again confront the
critical dilemma revealed by the Continental Illinois case. First, in the
run up to the financial crisis, an increasingly large fraction of credit
intermediation had moved away from bank-based intermediation to

77. Gordon & Muller, supra note 10, at 187-90. Indeed, some trace the advent of the
"too big to fail" bank to the Continental Illinois case. Gary H. Stern & Ron J. Feldman,
Too Big To Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts 13-17 (2004).
78. See James R. Barth et al., Policy Watch: The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the
Advent of Broad Banking, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 2000, at 191, 191 (explaining effect of
repeal of Glass-Steagall).
79. See Lee Davison, FDIC, Continental Illinois and "Too Big to Fail," in History of
The Eighties Vol. 1: An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s,
235, 244 (1997), available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235-258.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining how FDIC was prevented from using its
full resolution powers because of certain agreements that bank had with holding
company).
80. See id. (describing controversial resolution plan implemented by FDIC and the
Fed).
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market-based intermediation. 81 Although market-focused nonbanks did
not issue "deposits," they held long-term credit assets which they funded
through short-term credit issuances, including a particularly runnable form
of short-term finance, "repo," a kind of secured short-term borrowing that
may be collateralized by long-term assets of uncertain value. 2 The FDIC
had no authority to address the failure of such institutions, despite their
bank-like function and bank-like vulnerability. Thus, as Bear Stearns
headed to failure, the Federal Reserve was left with unpalatable choices:
Either rescue Bear Steams or Lehman Brothers through merger, which
protected creditors fully and shareholders partially, or be prepared to
deal with a disorderly resolution through bankruptcy.8 3 Lehman Brothers
showed the limits of the bankruptcy strategy.8 4
Second, even where a bank was involved, the bank might well be
entangled in a large financial conglomerate. Although the bank could be
resolved, the nonbank affiliates and parent would face bankruptcy.
Citibank, for example, was an operating subsidiary of Citigroup, Inc.
Citigroup's total assets in 2008 were approximately $2 trillion, only half
of which were assets of Citibank. Without the capacity to resolve the
entire entity, the FDIC's resolution power with respect to Citibank left it
with incomplete powers. Either it could rescue all of Citigroup (which
might have exceeded the capacity of the Deposit Insurance Fund and
possibly its drawing rights on the U.S. Treasury) or it could resolve Citibank
85
alone and face the disorderly bankruptcy of Citigroup.

81. See Samuel Antill, David Hou & Asani Sarkar, Components of U.S. Financial
Sector Growth, 1950-2013, FRBNY Econ. Pol'y Rev., Dec. 2014, at 59, 61 ("Growth in
shadow banking has been fueled by rapid expansion in credit inter-mediation services by
asset management and securities firms .... ").
82. See generally Adam Copeland et al., Key Mechanics of the U.S. Tri-Party Repo
Market, FRBNY Econ. Pol'y Rev., Nov. 2012, at 17, 17-21 (providing overview of U.S. repo
market). For the run risks of such funding, see Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick,
Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104J. Fin. Econ. 425, 447-48 (2012).
83. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 10, at 180-84 (discussing problems with both
bankruptcy and business combination strategies for Lehman Brothers and Bear Sterns);
Blinder, supra note 64, at 105 (discussing Fed's difficulties with Bear Stearns because it
"was not a bank"); cf. id. at 122 ("[Lehman CEO Richard] Fuld suggested that the Fed
protect Lehman by turning it into a bank holding company.").
84. See supra notes 10, 53 and accompanying text (describing losses associated with
taking Lehman into bankruptcy).
85. See Citigroup, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 4, 82 (Sept. 30, 2008)
(reporting total assets of USD 2.1 trillion and liabilities of $1.9 trillion, less than half of
which were reflected by deposits). The FDIC's ordinary line of credit with Treasury was
$100 billion; it could borrow up to $500 billion with consent of Treasury and the Fed. The
Deposit Insurance Fund had fallen to $10.4 billion in the second quarter of 2008 because
of the failure of twenty-four banks in that year. Jessica Holzer, FDIC Considers Borrowing
from Treasury to Shore Up Deposit Insurance, Wall St. J. (Sept. 18, 2008),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125328162000123101
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
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FDIC PROPOSES

TO RESOLVE A FAILING SIFI UNDER DODDFRANK: "SINGLE POINT OF ENTRY"

For path dependent reasons that we describe in Part IV, a systemically important financial firm in the United States will almost invariably
be organized through a holding company structure in which the principal assets of Topco, the publicly traded parent, are shares in the operating subsidiaries that carry on the diverse businesses of the entity. The
SIFI will commonly engage in commercial banking, both retail and
wholesale; the capital markets business, including broker-dealer activity,
trading, and investment banking; asset management through multiple
investment advisors; and various financial service activities, for example
custodial and clearing activities. All of these functions will be organized
as direct or indirect subsidiaries of the Topco parent. Some of the
subsidiaries will be organized in the United States, others in non-U.S. jurisdictions. The subsidiaries are likely to have complex financial arrangements
with one another, entailing the intraorganizational transfer of funds and
collateral. The subsidiaries will face different short-term credit claimants
with immediate liquidity rights, whether depositors or brokerage customers,
and will have different counterparty relationships with set-off and liquidation of collateral provisions. Figures 1 and 2 below, drawn from an
FDIC presentation, illustrate how a financial holding company that may
operate in a relatively small number of different business segments will
nevertheless use a complex legal organizational form.
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1: BUSINESS STRUCTURE 86
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86. FDIC Advisory Comm. on Systemic Resolution, Dodd-Frank Act Title II: Resolution
Strategy Overview 5 (2012), https://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/2012/2012-01-25-resolutionstrategy.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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2: LEGAL STRUCTURE 87
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As explained in Part II, Dodd-Frank has given the FDIC "Orderly
Liquidation Authority" powers; that is, the power to resolve all SIFIs
(banks and nonbanks) in a way that creditors, instead of taxpayers, will
bear losses. The FDIC's announced OLA strategy is "Single Point of
Entry."88 That is, in the event of financial distress beyond the SIFI's
capacity to address internally, the FDIC will initiate a receivership action
against Topco while specifically avoiding bankruptcy or a bank resolution
process for all subsidiaries of the entity that are "equity solvent," meaning
that they have positive value on a going concern basis.89
Take the case of a large bank subsidiary that suffers a large writedown in its loan book or takes a massive loss on a derivatives position.
Losses at the subsidiary level will be addressed initially through a writedown of Topco's equity and then debt in its subsidiary, followed by
further advances to the subsidiary as necessary. In short, Topco will be
obliged to serve as a "source of strength" to its bank subsidiary to the
extent of its capacity. 9 If such write-downs and advances would render
Topco insolvent, the FDIC will trigger an OLA action employing the
single-point-of-entry approach. Per the SPOE strategy, the new receivership transfers the assets of Topco, most particularly its ownership interest
in its operating subsidiaries, to a new financial holding company
organized by the FDIC, a "bridge" entity, Bridgeco. Topco's unsecured
liabilities (not the liabilities of any subsidiary, which are unaffected)
become claims against the receivership. The FDIC estimates the extent of
the losses, which it then apportions among equity holders and the

88. FDIC, Notice, Single Point of Entry, supra note 45, at 76,615.
89. On the SPOE approach in detail, see John F. Bovenzi et al., Too Big to Fail: The
Path to a Solution 23-32 (Wash., DC: Bipartisan Policy Ctr., 2013). For a general account,
see Randall D. Guynn, Framing the TBTF Problem: The Path to a Solution, in Across the
Great Divide: New Perspectives on the Financial Crisis, supra note 47, at 281, 281-301,
available at http://vw.hoover.org/sites/default/files/across-the-great-divide-ch13.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). The FDIC has recently outlined the SPOE strategy
in a request for public comments. FDIC, Notice, Single Point of Entry, supra note 45, at
76,615-24.
90. One important element clarified in the Dodd-Frank Act is the obligation of
Topco to cover losses in its operating subsidiaries, even where such losses would exceed
Topco's equity in those subsidiaries. This is the so-called "source of strength" doctrine, by
which a bank holding company is obliged to support its subsidiaries. Although the
doctrine has been contested in courts in the past, see Richard Herring &Jacopo Carmassi,
The Corporate Structure of International Financial Conglomerates: Complexity and Its
Implications for Safety and Soundness, in The Oxford Handbook of Banking 195, 207
(Allen N. Berger et al. eds., 2010), Dodd-Frank § 616 mandates that the Fed "shall
require" the bank holding company "to serve as a source of financial strength" for a bank
subsidiary, which is defined as "the ability.., to provide financial assistance ... in the
event of the financial distress of the insured depository institution." 12 U.S.C. § 1831o-1
(2012). Presumably this means that Topco will be required to enter into the undertakings
deemed necessary to assure that subsidiary liabilities can be upstreamed to the Topco
parent and that Topco's support can be downstreamed, as necessary to make SPOE
effective.
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unsecured creditors of Topco in accordance with their priority.91 Equity
holders will almost assuredly be eliminated and some fraction of the
unsecured debt will be written off. The remaining Topco unsecured debt
is converted into equity claims and unsecured liabilities of Bridgeco,
which is now fully capitalized. In effect, this Topco debt-known as "bailin debt"-is used to cover losses throughout the group and to re-equitize
a Bridgeco successor. 92 The former Topco creditors become Topco
shareholders. As this process is unfolding, the FDIC can supply liquidity
to Bridgeco, either through a direct cash infusion from the "Orderly
Liquidation Fund," generated through a drawdown on a Treasury line of
credit, or through the guarantee of new debt obligations issued by Bridgeco. 93
This is illustrated in Figure 3 below, drawn from a paper by Paul Tucker,
former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England.

91. Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chairman, FDIC, Remarks to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago at the Bank Structure Conference (May 10, 2012), https://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/speeches/chairman/spmayl012.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
92. The SPOE approach was recently described by then-Deputy Governor Paul
Tucker as follows:
Single-point-of-entry resolution involves working downwards from the top
company (Topco) in the group in an exercise that resolves the group as a whole,
wherever its problems began. Think of it this way. Losses in subsidiaries are first
transferred within the group to the Topco. If Topco is bankrupt as a result, the
group needs resolving. Bail-in can then be applied to the Topco's capital
structure: writing off the equity and, most likely, subordinated debt; and writing
down and partially converting into equity the senior (bonded) debt issued by
Topco. Those bondholders become the new owners.
Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability, Bank of Eng., Speech at the INSOL
International World Conference: Resolution and Future of Finance (May 20, 2013),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2013/658.aspx
(on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
93. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 204(d), 210(n) (8) (B), 124 Star. 1376, 1455, 1598 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5384(d), 5390(n)(8)(B)) (identifying how FDIC may supply "funds for the orderly
liquidation of a covered financial company" and noting FDIC may issue contingent
liabilities during receivership). As Bridgeco is incorporated and operated by the FDIC,
these obligations are full faith and credit obligations of the U.S. government.
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The upshot of this approach is that the holding companyspecifically, the shareholders and debtholders of Topco-bears the losses
of the operating subsidiaries. 95 The liabilities of the operating subsidiaries
will not go into default and will not be exposed to losses. This approach
should reassure depositors, other short-term credit suppliers, and
counterparties of the operating subsidiaries (the bank or broker-dealer, for
example) as to the financial stability of the relevant stressed subsidiaries
and thus should avoid a run and other potential unraveling effects. 96 The
long-term creditors and shareholders of Topco cannot run in the face of
impending financial distress because of the nature of their
commitment. 97 Because the subsidiaries' businesses are not disruptedbecause the systemic shock is contained-the ultimate creditor losses will be

94. Paul Tucker, Brookings, Regulatory Reform, Stability, and Central Banking 7
(2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01 / 16-regulatory-reformstability-central-banking-tucker (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
95. See Bovenzi et al., supra note 89, at 27 (" [T]he FDIC could effectively cause any
losses incurred at the operating subsidiary level to be pushed up to the failed holding
company's receivership.").
96. See id. at 27-28.
97. See id. at 28 ("The holding company's long-term, unsecured debt and other
capital structure liabilities would be structurally subordinated to any debt at the operating
subsidiary level .. ").
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much less. 98 This the FDIC regards as the lesson of Lehman Brothers. The
losses were far greater than the intrinsic asset write-downs. Rather, most of
the losses occurred because of value destructivity in the disorderly
bankruptcy: fire sale liquidations and lost going concern and franchise
value.99 To be sure, the SPOE strategy depends upon a sufficient layer of
unsecured debt in the liability structure of Topco, but the claim is that in
expectation of a well-managed resolution process, losses can be contained to
the point that a reasonable level of unsecured debt (plus capital) can cover
them. 100
An additional powerful feature of the SPOE is the way it can solve
the multiple resolution regime problem for firms that have operations in
different jurisdictions. If only Topco is put into resolution, if Bridgeco
can re-equitize the within-group obligations of a foreign subsidiary
(Subco) as necessary to preserve Subco's solvency, and if the FDIC can
flow liquidity support through Bridgeco to Subco, then Subco remains a
98. See id. at 27-28 (noting operating subsidiaries "would be kept out of receivership
or insolvency proceedings and would open for business at the normal opening time on the
day after resolution weekend or resolution night").
99. See The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the DoddFrank Act, FDIC Q., First Quarter 2011, at 31, 34, available at https://www.fdic.gov/
bank/analytical/quarterly/2011_vol5 2/Article2.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(explaining how resolution could have avoided massive losses of Lehman bankruptcy).
100. The FDIC describes the systemic stability advantages of an SPOE resolution as
follows:
U.S. SIFIs generally are organized under a holding company structure with a
top-tier parent and operating subsidiaries that comprise hundreds, or even
thousands, of interconnected entities that span legal and regulatory jurisdictions
across international borders and share funding and support services. Functions
and core business lines often are not aligned with individual legal entity
structures. Critical operations can cross legal entities and jurisdictions and
funding is often dispersed among affiliates as need arises. These integrated
structures make it very difficult to conduct an orderly resolution of one part of
the company without triggering a costly collapse of the entire company and
potentially transmitting adverse effects throughout the financial system ....
Additionally, the FDIC seeks to preserve financial stability by maintaining the
critical services, operations and funding mechanisms conducted throughout the
company's operating subsidiaries ....
The company's subsidiaries would remain open and operating, allowing
them to continue critical operations for the financial system and avoid the
disruption that would otherwise accompany their closings, thus minimizing
disruptions to the financial system and the risk of spillover effects to
counterparties .... [Thus,] counterparties to most of the financial company's
derivative contracts would have no legal right to terminate and net out their
contracts. Such action would prevent a disorderly termination of these contracts
and a resulting fire sale of assets.
FDIC, Notice, Single Point of Entry, supra note 45, at 76,615-16. The SPOE approach has
received international recognition via the November 2012 Financial Stability Board guidance.
See Fin. Stability Bd., Consultative Document: Recovery and Resolution Planning: Making the
Key Attributes Requirements Operational 13-28 (2012), available at http://www.financial
stabilityboard.org/publications/r_121102.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing
FSB's "Developing Resolution Strategies and Operational Resolution Plans").
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solvent and functional entity throughout the resolution of the SIFI of
which it is a part. The approach and its advantages are described in a
joint FDIC-Bank of England paper that contemplates cooperation
among major regulators in the resolution of cross-border firms in their
jurisdictions:
The strategies remove the need to commence foreign
insolvency proceedings or enforce legal powers over foreign
assets .... Liquidity should continue to be downstreamed from
the holding company to foreign subsidiaries and branches.
Given minimal disruption to operating entities, resolution
authorities, directors, and creditors of foreign subsidiaries and
branches should have little incentive to take action other than
to cooperate with the implementation of the group resolution.
In particular, host stakeholders should not have an incentive to
ringfence assets or petition for a preemptive insolvencypreemptive actions that would otherwise destroy value and may
disrupt markets at home and abroad.'" 1
To use the Lehman example: In an SPOE world, Lehman U.K.
would never have faced U.K. insolvency proceedings, because the FDIC
would have assured its solvency and liquidity. 0 2 The Clearing House
organized and conducted a comprehensive and sophisticated simulation
exercise of the operability of OLA in November 2012. 103 This important
test for the new system confirmed that Title II OLA could be a "viable
mechanism" for resolution of even large and complex SIFIs. 10 4 The
outcome of this exercise gave a boost to the credibility of the OLA approach
and supported its consideration in other jurisdictions. As stated above, the
FDIC projected that in the case of Lehman Brothers, an OLA resolution
would have resulted in losses of only 3%, approximately, versus disorderly
bankruptcy losses of 79%. 105 These figures and test results are so
compelling that the United States is currently negotiating agreements

101. FDIC & Bank of Eng., supra note 6, at 11-12. The claims in the paragraph are
made subject to the proviso that the resolving administrator has power "necessary to write
down or convert debt [claims] at the top of the group that are subject to foreign law." Id.
at 11. This power could be obtained by specific contractual provision in the debt instrument.
102. This is at least the hope. This Essay cannot exclude the possibility that the FDIC
in practice is subject to practical considerations and political pressure that would taint its
unilateral perspective and approach.
103. The Clearing House, Report on the Orderly Liquidation Authority Resolution
Symposium and Simulation (2013), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/files/
association%20documents/20130117%20tch%20resolution%20simulation%20symposium
%20report.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The Clearing House is the trade
association for large banking organizations.
104. Id. at 6.
105. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. The main reason for the difference is
that the main losses in the failure of a large financial institution will derive from disorderly
failure; these losses can be avoided through an effective resolution process.
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a view
with other countries-including Germany and Switzerland-with
10 6
to reach similar agreements to the one in place with the U.K.
As previously noted, the critical element for success with this
approach is a sufficient layer of unsecured term debt at the parent
holding company level. This "self-insurance" layer must be large enough
both to absorb the losses throughout the conglomerate that are left after
equity is wiped out and, upon conversion of the remainder, to recapitalize
10 7
Bridgeco in accordance with Basel III and national requirements.
Moreover, to minimize contagion effects, the debt must be held outside the
financial sector: It can't be that Bank A or even Life Insurer Z holds a
significant chunk of the term debt of Bank F.1 8 In order for the SPOE
scheme to work effectively, the regulators' decision to put Bank F into
receivership cannot be constrained by the concern that a write-down of
Bank Fs term debt will imperil another systemically important financial
institution.
The FDIC is currently consulting with a view to ascertain precisely
how much debt should be required to be available at the Topco level. 0 9
The Federal Reserve seems almost certain to propose a concrete longterm debt requirement for the largest SIFIs." 0 Indeed, because the selfinsurance, "bail-in" approach to the resolution of systemically important
banks has now become the international standard, the level of loss absor106. See Bloomberg Bus., FDIC's Gruenberg on Resolution Strategy for Banks (Nov.
21, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/video/fdic-s-gruenberg-on-resolution-strategy-forbanks-g5YN2PiESFyCrIsluANWJQ.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining
ongoing international negotiations in pursuit of U.S.-U.K. model).
107. See Fin. Stability Bd., Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial
Institutions 47-48 (2014), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/
r_141015.pdf [hereinafter FSB, Key Attributes] (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing essential elements of recovery and resolution plans).
108. See Fin. Stability Bd., Consultative Document: Adequacy of Loss-Absorbing
Capacity of Global Systemically Important Banks in Resolution 18 (Nov. 2014),
www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/TLAC-Condoc-6-Nov-2014FINAL.pdf [hereinafter FSB, Adequacy of Loss-Absorbing Capacity] (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (suggesting G-SIBs should "deduct from [their] own regulatory
capital certain investments in the regulatory capital of other banks"); Paul Tucker, The
Resolution of Financial Institutions Without Taxpayer Solvency Support: Seven
Retrospective Clarifications and Elaborations 9 (July 3, 2014), http://www.cepr.org/sites/
default/files/events/papers/6708_TUCKER%2OEssay.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (explaining avoiding systemic fragility requires "[b]ank bonds not [to] be held by
banks" or "anything resembling a bank").
109. FDIC, Notice, Single Point of Entry, supra note 45, at 76,623.
110. See Daniel K Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks
at the Federal Reserve Board and Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Conference, "Planning
for the Orderly Resolution of a Globally Systemically Important Bank": Toward Building a
More Effective Resolution Regime: Progress and Challenges 11 (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20131018a.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (stating Board of Governors will issue "a proposal that would require
the largest, most complex banking firms to hold minimum amounts of long-term,
unsecured debt at the holding company level").
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bency is likely to become a matter of international convention, like the
capital rules set in Basel III. At the November 2014 summit meeting of
the G-20 leaders, the Financial Stability Board, in its role as post-crisis
agenda setter, submitted a proposal for "Total Loss Absorbency Capacity"
(TLAC), meaning capital plus loss-absorbing debt, equal to at least twice
the amount of required equity capital on both risk-weighted and leverage
measures."' The firm-specific required level of TLAC will vary, depending
on the particular institution, from at least 16% up to 25% of risk weighted
assets." 2
Financial institutions are unlikely to issue sufficient unsecured term
debt without regulatory prodding.' " Capital, not loss absorbency through
unsecured term debt, has been the focus of Basel.' 14 In the wake of the
FDIC's and the international regulatory community's renewed focus on
resolution through bail-in, the Fed has now signaled that it is likely to mandate such a capital-structure innovation.' 15 Other countries are exploring
similar strategies. 116
To return to the main theme: One crucial advantage of the SPOE
approach is that it offers a credible path to the resolution of large finan-

111. FSB, Adequacy of Loss-Absorbing Capacity, supra note 108, at 6.
112. Id. at 13. The threshold limits were based on calculation of losses during the
recent financial crisis in an earlier consultation document. See Memorandum from the
Fin. Stability Bd. to the Steering Comm., Issues for Consideration in the Development of a
Proposal on Adequacy of Loss Absorbing Capacity in Resolution, SC/2013/45, Annex at
26-31 (Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter FSB Steering Committee Memo] (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
113. The customary positive slope of the yield curve may favor shorter-term debt.
Because of the run risk, short-term debt is more likely to be "bailed out," hence cheaper.
More generally, unsecured term debt, because it is better suited to bearing losses, is less
likely to benefit from a "too big to fail" subsidy.
114. See Bovenzi et al., supra note 89, at 28-29 (referencing Basel III capitalrequirements proposals).
115. AsJanetYellen remarked,
In consultation with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal
Reserve is considering the merits of a regulatory requirement that the largest,
most complex U.S. banking firms maintain a minimum amount of long-term
unsecured debt outstanding. Such a requirement could enhance the prospects
for an orderly SIFI resolution. Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
European Union are moving forward on similar requirements, and it may be
useful to work toward an international agreement on minimum total loss
absorbency requirements for global SIFIs.
Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the
International Monetary Conference: Regulatory Landscapes: A U.S. Perspective 5 (June 3,
2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20l3O6O2a.pdf
(on file
with the Columbia Law Review); accord Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Industry Structure and Systemic Risk Regulation, Remarks at the
Brookings Institution Conference on Structuring the Financial Industry to Enhance
Economic Growth and Stability 12 (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/tarullo20121204a.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
116. Yellen, supra note 115.
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cial institutions without reliance on deposit insurance guarantees either
to fund the transaction or to mitigate the risk of destructive depositor
runs. The depository subsidiary will be protected by the debt layer at the
holding company level, and, implicitly, by the administrator's determination to make the SPOE approach, once undertaken, succeed. Although
some have asserted that uninsured deposits should be at risk, we think
that such an approach would undermine the credibility of a resolution
regime. Wholesale short-term credit suppliers in particular can engage in
self-help, either through run behavior or through insistence on secured
lending via repo. Both scenarios are destabilizing: the run risk for
obvious reasons; the repo strategy because it may produce a slow run as
creditors insist on larger haircuts on the securities taken as collateral.
Because of the destructive effect of a run on a large SIFI in anticipation
of loss-sharing by depositors, regulators are likely to provide forbearance.
By contrast, imposition of losses on unsecured term creditors is credible
precisely because they are locked in, and this in turn buttresses the
disciplinary threat of resolution.
With a similar satisfactory resolution regime, the European Banking
Union project can run on its two legs.
IV. HOLDING COMPANY STRUCTURE: PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES; DECISION FOR THE E.U.

A critical institutional feature for the success of SPOE is a top-level
holding company whose assets consist primarily of equity and intracompany debt claims in its operating subsidiaries and whose liabilities
consist principally of nonrunnable term debt issued to the public. Large
bank-centered financial companies in the United States are invariably
organized in the holding company form, indeed, as "bank holding companies" (BHCs). This result derives from regulatory path dependence
rather than a prior view about the optimal form of financial firm
organization. 117 Until approximately twenty years ago, the U.S. financial
sector was highly balkanized. Bank expansion was limited by restrictive
branching laws that limited interstate banking, even intrastate
banking.'l 8 The "business of banking" was narrowly defined to exclude

117. The text in this Part draws from many sources, including Saule T. Omarova &
Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding
Company Regulation in the United States, 31 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 113 (2011); Calomiris
& Haber, supra note 71, at 195-202; Charles W. Calomiris, U.S. Bank Deregulation in
Historical Perspective (2000); Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 74; Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition,
Consolidation, and Increased Risk, 2002 Ill. L. Rev. 215.
118. See, e.g., McFadden Act of 1933, ch. 191, 44 Star. 1224 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 36
(1988)) (establishing "conditions upon which a national banking association may retain or
establish and operate a branch").
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banks from the provision of many financial services." 9 And commercial
banks were famously barred from engaging in securities underwriting
and other investment bank activity by the Glass-Steagall Act. 20 The result
was a relatively small number of "money center" banks, thousands of
"unit banks," and many thousands of different financial service
providers. 121
One way that banks attempted to navigate through these regulatory
barriers was through the creation of holding companies. Although a
bank could not "branch," a parent holding company could acquire banks
in a particular geographic area, and the sibling subsidiary banks could
form a network that could provide many of the functional equivalents of
branch banking. Although a bank might be unable to provide a particular financial service directly or through a direct subsidiary, a sibling
subsidiary of the holding company could. 122 In 1956, the holding company structure was both legitimated and regulated through the Bank
Holding Company Act, which limited (for a time) geographic expansion
and which specified that the permitted subsidiaries of the BHC must be
"closely related to banking."' 121 When Glass-Steagall finally fell in 1999,
the holding company structure was nevertheless the vehicle through
which financial services expansion took place. Banks remained barred
from securities underwriting and related investment banking activities.
However, banks could affiliate through the holding company structure
with investment banks and full service broker dealers. Moreover, large,
well-capitalized BHCs could become "financial holding companies,"
which were permitted to engage in a broader set of activities that were
"financial in nature," or "incidental" or "complementary" to such
activity, and that could include both insurance underwriting and
merchant banking activity.' All of these activities were to occur through

119. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2013) (limiting, for example, "[t]he business of
dealing in securities and stock").
120. The Glass-Steagall Act is the term commonly used to refer to four sections of the
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C §§ 24
(Seventh), 78, 377, 378a (2012)). See Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971)
(providing capacious reading of Glass-Steagall).
121. See Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 117, at 124 n.35 (tracking number of financial
institutions).
122. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2013) (limiting ways in which banks can provide
financial services directly). See generally Carnell, Macey & Miller., supra note 74, at 48594.
123. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841, 1843(k); see also Carl A.
Sax & Marcus H. Sloan III, The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 39
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1200, 1218 (1970) ("Under the 1956 Act, bank holding companies
were permitted to conduct nonbank business, all the activities of which were of a
'financial, fiduciary or insurance nature' and were 'so closely related to the business of
banking' as to be a proper incident thereto.").
124. See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C. (2012))

1332

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:1297

subsidiaries of the bank holding company. Preexisting rules limited the
extent to which the affiliated bank could provide financial support to
25
these sibling subsidiaries.'
The point is this: The evolution of the U.S. banking system has
proceeded in such a way that the largest banking groups are organized as
bank holding companies. In general, a public parent, Topco, sits astride a
cluster of financial subsidiaries. Such a structure vastly facilitates a resolution strategy like SPOE. We shall explore later, in Part VI, how the
E.U.'s bank structural reform project, the so-called "Liikanen process,"
could be turned in this direction. But first, we must understand where
Europe stands now.
V. EUROPEAN RESPONSES TO FAILING BANKS: MULTILEVEL BATTLES

So far, this paper has considered the developments in the United
States to illustrate the creation of the FDIC and its resolution powers
operating in a federal system of banking regulation. The following Parts
return to Europe to apply the insights gained from the U.S. context. This
Part briefly describes the initial responses by European regulators to
failing banks and the gradual development toward a federal resolution
regime. It also sketches out the shortcomings of the current regulatory
framework. Subsequently, Part VI will apply the key insights learned from
the FDIC's experience, as discussed above, to develop a way forward for
an effective and operational bank resolution framework within the
Banking Union.
The European response to the banking crisis was characterized by four
separate phases. Distinguishing these phases illustrates the European
learning process during the crisis. Part V.A describes the first two phases.
The first reaction was to fashion simple, straightforward, and typically
uncoordinated bail-out programs, led by the individual Member States.
During this phase, there was almost no involvement at the E.U. level. In
the second phase, Member States began adopting national resolution
regimes, at different speeds and with different priorities. Part V.B describes the third phase, marked by efforts to coordinate national resolution regimes by way of the E.U. Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.
This directive harmonizes the national regimes, but essentially leaves
resolution power on the State level. Part V.C describes the latest step: an
attempt to federalize resolution power and authority at the E.U. level.
This is the second pillar of the Banking Union, which is of special
interest for the present study.
(repealing Glass-Steagall and substantially amending the Bank Holding Company Act).
More specifically, see 12 U.S.C § 843(k) (4) (H), (I).
125. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, §§ 23A, 23B, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (2012)); Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-LeachBliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act,
89 N.C. L. Rev. 1683, 1686 (2011) (arguing Section 23A rules are too porous).
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NationalResponses: From Bail-Outs to Resolution Regimes

1. UncoordinatedBailouts. - The Crisis hit hard in Europe. Reactions
were characterized at first by a reinvigoration of the nation state:
National governments and Member States were the main players during
2007-2009, and the federal E.U. institutions were almost mute. National
governments took the crucial decisions over bailouts, which proved difficult in many instances precisely because of the cross-border character of
many large banks in Europe. The most salient example was the Beneluxbased Fortis Bank, whose pan-European character created particular
difficulties. 26 E.U. institutions played a decidedly secondary role, principally though the review of the bailouts through the lens of E.U. "state
aid" rules 127-which were then bent to virtual nonrecognition. 128 While
academics quickly moved to criticize bailout programs, 129 policymakers
moved more slowly from bailout to resolution.
2. Transition to Resolution Regimes. - After a number of costly
bailouts,13 the U.K. was the first European country to introduce a formal

126. See Martin (ihAk & Erlend Nier, The Need for Special Resolution Regimes for
Financial Institutions-The Case of the European Union, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 395, 429-30

(2012).
127. The E.U. state aid framework seeks to ensure that no Member State supports
domestic firms over others, thereby distorting competition in the European internal
market. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 107, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47.
128. Mathias Dewatripont, European Banking: Bailout, Bail-in and State Aid Control,
34 Int'l. J. Indus. Org. 37, 42 (2014) (describing post-bailout state aid provisions); Conor
Quigley, State Aid and the Financial Crisis, in Legal Challenges in the Global Financial
Crisis 131-35 (Wolf-Georg Ringe & Peter M. Huber eds., 2014).
129. See, e.g., Mathias Dewatripont & Xavier Freixas, Bank Resolution: A Framework
for the Assessment of Regulatory Intervention, 27 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol'y 411, 427 (2011)
(advocating for ex ante approach to intervention); Eva Hflpkes, Special Bank Resolution
and Shareholders' Rights: Balancing Competing Interests, 17 J. Fin. Reg. & Compliance
277, 285-86 (2009) (explaining how bailout programs "completely wiped out" or
"significantly diluted" shareholders); Achim Dfibel, The Capital Structure of Banks and
Practice of Bank Restructuring 71-75 (Ctr. for Fin. Servs., Working Paper No. 2013/04,
2013), available at https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/cfswop/201304.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (drawing policy lessons from case studies); Thomas F Huertas, The
Road to Better Resolution: From Bail Out to Bail In 7 (London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci.
Fin. Mkts. Grp., Special Paper No. 195/2010, 2010), available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/
fmg/workingPapers/specialPapers/PDF/SP195.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
("We must move away from a policy of full support for systemically important financial
institutions.
130. The crisis at mortgage lender Northern Rock marked the beginning of the U.K.'s slide
into (temporary) large-scale state ownership of the banking system. See Northern Rock Now in
Public Hands, BBC News (Feb. 22, 2008, 11:01 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/
politics/7258492.stm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing nationalization of
Northern Rock). "[A]t the height of the global financial panic, the British government
took dramatic steps to nationalize Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds TSB. A £20 billion
injection was exchanged for a 58% stake in RBS, and £17 billion bought 40% of Lloyds."
Editorial, Bank-Bailout Lessons, Wall St. J. (June 1, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/
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resolution scheme. Initially adopting emergency legislation, 131 the U.K
moved to a more permanent rescue mechanism through the Banking Act
2009.132 This Act assigned the role of the lead authority to the Bank of
England (rather than to the Treasury); it allowed for a number of
restructuring alternatives, including the possibility of putting a bank into
temporary public ownership. 3 3 Many of the instruments are similar to
the powers of the U.S. FDIC and were in fact inspired by the FDIC
Improvement Act of 1991.134 The Banking Act has been used twice, for
rather minor cases.13 5 It is important to note that the government also
introduced requirements, set out under the Financial Services Act 2010,
for all deposit-taking institutions and significant investment1 3 6firms to
produce recovery and resolution plans (so-called "living wills").
Several other European states introduced similar measures. In
Germany, the paradigm shift from the "rescue" phase to the "restructuring" phase was marked by the implementation of the Restructuring
articles/SB10001424052702303640104577437660160342388 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
131. The Banking (Special Provisions) Act, 2008, c. 2 (U.K) was introduced as
emergency legislation to facilitate the steps to save Northern Rock in 2008. It was
subsequently used for two other cases, the rescue of Bradford & Bingley and the U.K- assets
of Icelandic banks Kaupthing and Landsbanki. See Bank of Eng., Resolutions Prior to the
Banking Act 2009, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/role/risk_
reduction/srr/prior.aspx# (last visited Feb. 19, 2015) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing institutions resolved under the Banking (Special Provisions) Act).
132. Banking Act, 2009, c. 1 (U.K-). Two other major banks fell victim to the crisis in
2008: Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and HBOS/Lloyds. They both had to be
recapitalized. See Andrew Porter et al., Financial Crisis: HBOS and RBS 'to be
Nationalised' in £50 Billion State Intervention, Telegraph (Oct. 12, 2008, 8:32 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/3 185120/Financial-crisis-HBOS-andRBS-to-be-nationalised-in-50-billion-state-intervention.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing decision of U.K. government to take majority shareholder position in
RBS and HBOS). Learning from these experiences, the government designed the Banking
Act 2009 to equip the regulator with adequate powers to deal with all possible situations.
On the Banking Act in detail, see Peter Brierley, Bank of Eng., Financial Stability Paper
No. 5, The UK Special Resolution Regime for Failing Banks in an International Context 313 (2009).
133. See Kern Alexander, Bank Resolution Regimes: Balancing Prudential Regulation
and Shareholder Rights, 9 J. Corp. L. Stud. 61, 90-92 (2009) (discussing restructuring
powers granted by Banking Act 2009); Emilios Avgouleas, Banking Supervision and the
Special Resolution Regime of the Banking Act 2009: The Unfinished Reform, 4 Cap. Mkts.
L.J. 201, 212-27 (2009) (detailing structure and objectives of Banking Act 2009 and
discussing requirements and process for exercise of stabilization powers).
134. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), was the U.S.
response to the 1980s Savings & Loans financial crisis.
135. These cases were Dunfermline Building Society, the largest building society in
Scotland, and Southsea Mortgage and Investment Company. See Jill Treanor, Southsea Bank
Declared Insolvent, Guardian (June 16, 2011, 3:07 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
business/2011/jun/16/southsea-bank-declared-insolvent (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
136. Financial Services Act, 2010, c. 28, § 7 (U.K.).
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Act on January 1, 2011.137 Under the new regime, the German market
supervisor, BaFin, received extended powers of intervention and special
restructuring; further, reorganization instruments for German banks
were introduced. The costs of any such measures would no longer be
borne by the taxpayer but instead by the banking industry. "8 Technically,
this would be achieved by means of a bank levy payable by all German
banks, the proceeds of which flow into the newly established
Restructuring Fund administered by the newly created Federal Agency
for Financial Market Stabilization (FMSA). 139 Amounts payable under the
bank levy increase with the size of the bank and its degree of
interconnectedness within the financial system. 40 The target is to raise a
fund of €70 billion over a number of years.141
A more general look at this early post-crisis phase in Europe reveals
an evolution from the traditional bailout, in which all creditors were
protected even if shareholders were wiped out, to more differentiated,
modem versions where occasionally creditors have had to join in as well.
Indeed, when Spain bailed out its savings banks (known as "cajas") in
2012, it decided to impose losses not just on common shareholders, but
also on preferred shareholders and unsecured bondholders, including
retail bondholders. 4 2 Similarly, in the recent nationalization of Dutch
bank and insurance group SNS Reaal, the Netherlands imposed losses on
SNS Reaal's shareholders, subordinated debt holders, and some hybrid
securities, but not on senior debt or covered bonds.'43 The Dutch

137. Restrukturierungsgesetz [Restructuring Act], Dec. 9, 2010, Bundesgesetzblatt,
Teil I [BGBI. I] at 1900 (Ger.).
138. Previously, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the German government
had introduced a state-backed financial market stabilization package, Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz [FMStG] [Financial Market Stabilization Act], Oct. 17, 2008, BGBI. I
at 1982 (Ger.). See Allen & Overy, The German Bank Restructuring and Bad Bank
Regime: Its Impact on Investors 5 (2012), available at http://www.allenovery.com/
SiteCollectionDocuments/The%20German%20bank%20restructuring%20and%20bad%20
bank%20regime.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing Special Market
Stabilization Fund, a key aspect of German bailout scheme).
139. Officially, "Bundesanstalt ffir Finanzmarktstabilisierung." For information in
English, see FMSA, Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilisation (FMSA),
http://www.fmsa.de/en/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
140. FMSA, Bank Levy, http://www.fma.de/en/fmsa/restructuring-fund/banklevy/index.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
141. Id.
142. Graziella Marras, Basel III, Resolution, Bail-in, Bailout, Ring-fencing, and Banking
Union: What Does the Future Hold for Banks and Their Investors, CFA Inst. Mkt. Integrity
Insights Blog (Feb. 25, 2013), http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2013/02/25/
basel-iii-resolution-bail-in-bailout-ring-fencing-and-banking-union-what-does-the-futurehold-for-banks-and-their-investors/ (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review).
143. Thomas Escritt & Anthony Deutsch, Dutch Nationalise SNS Reaal Bank Group in $14
Billion Rescue, Reuters (Feb. 1, 2013, 4:35 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/
02/01/uk-dutch-finance-cbank-idUKBRE9100A420130201 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
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government made use of new powers granted under the 2012
Intervention Act. 144
3. Shortcomings. - The general perception during the crisis was that
the European response to the crisis was inadequate and insufficient in
many respects. First, the renaissance of the individual nation-state during
the crisis (as discussed above) meant that each E.U. Member State was
concerned with itself and failed to take into account the European
dimension of the bank rescues (or omitted rescues) that took place. This
led to collective action problems and externalities, particularly given the
nature and extent of cross-border banking in the E.U. In one notable
case, involving Benelux-based Fords Bank, there were severe difficulties
in determining the individual states' responsibilities for resolution purposes. Fortis Bank had a strong presence in all three Benelux countries
and was subject to a relatively well-developed cooperation agreement
among its supervisors.'4 5 Despite this, the authorities from the different
Member States were unable to agree on a rescue plan that might have
maintained the cohesion of the group structure. A genuine European
solution was out of the question, as the E.U. itself was equipped with no
resolution powers. As a consequence, the concerned states failed to
sustain a multilateral resolution, and the group was split up along geographical boundaries and not along a more logical and cost-effective
division between business lines. 146 The resolution plan sacrificed value."'
The second, and related, problem was the observed forbearance of
national regulators toward their own supervisees, i.e., their own banks.
Supervisors exhibited leniency toward their own banks at various
moments in the financial crisis partly because they feared the consequences of their intervention and partly because they wanted to shield
their own supervisory failures. 4 These pressures were particularly strong
144. Wet van 24 mei 2012 tot wijziging van de Wet op het financieel toezicht en de
Faillissementswet, alsmede enige andere wetten in verband met de introductie van
aanvullende bevoegdheden tot interventie bij financifile ondememingen in problemen
(Wet bijzondere maatregelen financifle ondememingen), Stb. 2012, p. 241 (Neth.),
available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/bwbr0031641/geldigheidsdatum-1-02-2015 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (providing special measures to deal with failing financial
companies).
145. See Commission Impact Assessment Accompanying the Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee, the European Court of Justice, and the European Central Bank, on an EU
Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, at 16-17, SEC 1389
(2009) [hereinafter, European Union, Impact Assessment] (relating history of Fortis
Bank).
146. Kudrna, supra note 17, at 288-90 (describing failure to sustain multilateral
resolution in Fortis case); European Union, Impact Assessment, supra note 145, at 16-17
(same).
147. Cf. Kudrna, supra note 17, at 290 (noting Fortis break-up only had "relative
success" (emphasis added)).
148. See Dfibel, supra note 129, at 4-58 (providing case studies of failures of eight
European banks).
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in situations where several or many local banks had problems and intervention risked a credit crunch.149 But failure to intervene early
intensified the crisis overall because of the cross-border externalities.
Therefore, the only way to effectively overcome the inherent national
bias is to implement supervision and resolution on the European level.
The third European problem related to the interconnectedness
between a State and its banks. As the financial crisis developed into the
European sovereign debt crisis, it became clear that some countries'
balance sheets were simply not large enough to rescue their own banks.
The perceived interdependence of sovereign and bank creditworthiness
created a downward spiral of weak banks progressively undermining
sovereigns that were, in turn, trying to bail out their own failing banks. 15 0
This trend was exacerbated by the "home bias" exhibited by European
banks, in which they held large amounts of home-country sovereign
debt. 5' In recognition of these deep problems, the Euro Area Council
declared in June 2012 that it is52"imperative to break the vicious circle
between banks and sovereigns." 1
All three problems have been particularly salient within the
Eurozone, where a common monetary policy in the hands of the ECB
has prompted close economic and financial integration both among
banks and among Member States and therefore increased the possibility
of cross-border spillover effects in the event of a banking crisis. 5 ' The
existing mechanisms were hardly sufficient to handle these effects. Coordination between supervisors turned out to be nothing more than a first
step. The state aid restrictions 154 proved to be an ineffectual antibailout
tool, yet the bailouts themselves were insufficient to end the crisis. The
self-evident shortfalls prompted ECB president Mario Draghi to assert
that only a centralized resolution scheme could "credibly pursue the least
cost resolution strategy, assessing possible cross-border spillover effects
and systemic concerns, and ensuring that resolution costs are first and

149. European Systemic Risk Bd., Advisory Sci. Comm., Forbearance, Resolution and
Deposit Insurance 1 (2012), available at https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/
Reports.ASC_1_1207.pdf?78d247d3fd283c5df365c401e147f0f0 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
150. Standard & Poor's Rating Servs., European Sovereigns 4 (2012),
http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/swf/ereports/eurosovereign/EuroSovereign/
document/AveDoc.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
151. Gros, supra note 13, at 93; see also Gallo et al., supra note 12, at 4 (showing data
on European banks' asset holdings).
152. Euro Area Summit Statement (June 29, 2012) [hereinafter Euro Area Summit
Statement, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsdata/docs/pressdata/
en/ec/131359.pdf] (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
153. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council: A Roadmap Towards a Banking Union, at 3, COM (2012) 510 final (Sept. 12,
2012) [hereinafter European Commission, Roadmap].
154. See supra note 127 (describing E.U. state aid rules).
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foremost borne by the private sector. It would" 155
thereby minimise resolution costs without recourse to taxpayer money.
B.

More Internationally CoordinatedEfforts

1. Pre-BRRD Coordination.- In order to prevent future crises and to
address the "too-big-to-fail problem," policymakers and regulators found
it necessary to develop an international recovery and resolution
framework for systemically important financial institutions. This was the
hour of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international body which had
been created in 1999 to coordinate internationally the work of national
financial authorities and international standard setting bodies. 5 ' Though
the FSB was little recognized in its first decade, the crisis provided the
opportunity for the organization to play an active role in shaping the
coordination of international regulatory efforts. In 2011, the FSB
adopted its "Key Attributes" of effective resolution regimes, a type of
best-practices guide, which was then updated in October 2014.157 These
Key Attributes recommended, inter alia, that the scope of national
resolution regimes should extend to all financial institutions whose
failure could have systemic consequences; that national regulators should
wield broad resolution powers, including transfer powers and explicit
bail-in powers to write down debt and to convert it to equity; creditor
safeguards; and that the funding in resolution should come from deposit
guarantee scheme funds or separate resolution funds. Addressing the
international dimension of bank failures, the Key Attributes recommended an approach to cross-border resolution based on "modified
universalism," with a presumption of cooperation between home and
host authorities-but host authorities would be in a fallback position to
take independent action if necessary to protect financial stability in the
host jurisdiction. The Key Attributes have received powerful political
endorsement, most notably by way of formal declaration at the 2011 G20
Summit in Cannes. 158
155. Mario Draghi, President, Eur. Cent. Bank., Introductory Statement at the
Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European
Parliament 3 (Feb. 18, 2013.)
156. See Chris Brummer, Minilateralism 107-09, 193 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014);
James R. Barth et al., Systemically Important Banks (SIBs) in the Post-Crisis Era: The
Global Response, and Responses Around the Globe for 135 Countries, in The Oxford
Handbook of Banking 617 (Allen N. Berger, Philip Molyneux &John O.S. Wilson eds., 2d
ed. 2015) (describing G20-FSB interaction and initiatives); Daniel E. Nolle, Who's in
Charge of Fixing the World's Financial System? The Un[?]der-Appreciated Lead Role of
the G20 and the FSB, 24 Fin. Mkts., Institutions & Instruments 1, 3-14 (2015) (describing
formation of and motivation behind FSB).
157. FSB, Key Attributes, supra note 107.
158. G20, Cannes Summit Final Declaration-Building Our Common Future:
Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All 1 28 (2011), available at
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20 resources/library/Declaration-eng-Cannes.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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In the wake of these recommendations, national governments
adjusted their already adopted resolution mechanisms. U.K lawmakers
decided to reform the Banking Act 2009 in order to extend the scope of
the resolution mechanism to include nonbanks whose failure could be
systemic, to include branches of non-E.U. foreign banks in the E.U.
within the Act's scope and to include explicit bail-in tools. These considerations led to the amendment of the Banking Act 2009 via the Financial
Services Act 2012' 59 and the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act
2013.160 Eventually the E.U. Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive
61
delivered many of these reforms for Europe generally.
2. The Path Toward the E. U. Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. We have previously described the front-line role of the Member States in
addressing the financial crisis. 6 2 During the same period, E.U.
governance institutions worked to prepare a systematic response.1 63 The
Commission initially pursued a two-part strategy to address bank failures:
first, to enhance macro- and micro-supervision on the E.U. level; and
second, to begin to harmonize Member States' resolution mechanisms.
Focusing on the latter, an October 2009 Commission Communication
presented the Commission's views on the development of a regulatory
framework for limiting the systemic impact of a failing cross-border
bank.16 4 In 2010, the Commission announced an E.U. "crisis management framework" that included a bank resolution fund. 165 Importantly, this framework envisioned only a supporting role for the E.U.,
leaving power in the Member States' hands and ensuring that "Member
State authorities have common tools that can be used in a coordinated
manner to allow prompt and legally robust action in the event of major
banking failures, protecting the broader financial system, avoiding costs

159. Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 21, at 169-97 (U.K) (amending Banking Act 2009 in
Part 8).
160. Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act, 2013, c. 33 (U.K.).
161. See infra text accompanying notes 177-182 (discussing adoption of BRRD).
162. See supra Parts V.A-B.
163. See generally Legal Challenges in the Global Financial Crisis: Bail-outs, the Euro,
and Regulation (Wolf-Georg Ringe & Peter M. Huber eds., 2014); see also Lucia Quaglia,
Financial Regulation and Supervision in the European Union After the Crisis, 16J. Econ.
Pol'y Reform 17, 18-25 (2013) ("A host of new regulatory initiatives were undertaken by
the EU in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, besides the short-term crisis
management measures adopted in the midst of the turmoil.").
164. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Court of Justice and the
European Central Bank: An EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the
Banking Sector, COM (2009) 561 final (Oct. 20, 2009).
165. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Central Bank: Bank
Resolution Funds, COM (2010) 254 final (May 26, 2010) [hereinafter European
Commission, Bank Resolution Funds].
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for taxpayers and ensuring a level playing field." 16 6 The European
Commission stressed that it could not go further:
In principle, pooling resources into a single pan EU resolution
fund would deliver clear benefits by: increasing risk
diversification; delivering economies of scale; reducing the
amount that would be subject to burden sharing; providing the
right incentives for cooperation; speeding up decision-making;
and guaranteeing a level playing field. It would also better
reflect the pan-EU nature of banking markets, in particular for
cross border banking groups.
However, the Commission recognises that it would be very
difficult to begin with the creation of an EU Resolution Fund in
the absence of an integrated EU supervisory and crisis
management framework. The European approach to the
establishment of bank resolution funds should mirror the
broader approach to supervisory arrangements.
For that reason, an appropriate first step could be a system
based around the establishment of a harmonized network of
of coordinated national crisis
national funds linked to a 6set
7
management arrangements. 1
Following this first step, a 2010 Communication aimed to identify
the elements of coordinated national crisis management arrangements. 168 It specified that national authorities should be broadly equipped
with "common and effective tools and powers to tackle bank crises at the
earliest possible moment" while avoiding costs for taxpayers. 169 The
common toolbox would include: (i) "preparatory and preventative
measures," including "living wills"; 7 ' (ii) supervisory power to force a
bank to undertake early stage remedial action; 7' and (iii) resolution
tools, such as the power to effect a takeover of a failing bank by a sound
institution or a transfer of all or part of its business to a temporary bridge

166. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 6-7.
168. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the
European Central Bank: An EU Framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector,
at 4-12, COM (2010) 579 final (Oct. 20, 2010) [hereinafter EU Framework for Crisis
Management].
169. Memorandum from the Eur. Comm'n on an EU Framework for Crisis
Management in the Financial Sector-Frequently Asked Questions 1 (Oct. 20, 2010),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-10-506_en.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
170. EU Framework for Crisis Management, supra note 168, at 5-6. A living will
requirement would call for institutions and authorities to prepare for both recovery and
resolution through anticipatory planning for financial stress or failure.
171. Id. at 8. Such remedial action could include the replacement of management, the
implementation of a recovery plan, or the divestiture "of activities or business lines that
pose an excessive risk to its financial soundness." Id.
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bank, so as to ensure both the7 2continuity of essential services and the
orderly management of failure.
Unlike the Member States, the Commission also had to grapple with
the specific problem of cross-border banking. Cross-border banking
dramatically increased in the E.U. in the years before the financial
crisis,' 7 3 but no system existed to deal with the complications of the
failure of a bank that operated in multiple States. In the 2010
Communication, the Commission proposed arrangements to ensure that
local authorities coordinated and cooperated as fully as possible in order
to minimize harmful effects of a cross-border bank failure.1 74 Again, this
left the national authorities as key players and facilitated cooperation; it
built on existing supervisory colleges (groups of national supervisors) to
set up resolution colleges (where supervisors and national authorities in
charge of resolution would meet), for the purposes of crisis preparation
and management. 175 The Commission established the European Banking
Authority (EBA) to have a coordination and support role in crisis
situations amongst the primarily responsible national authorities. 7 '
During the following years, the Commission undertook the slow and
painful process of pushing through a legislative project to harmonize
resolution powers across the E.U. Member States. This required approval
of the European Parliament and the European Council, a body in which
the Member States are directly represented. Adoption of the E.U. Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive finally came in April 2014.177 The
BRRD corresponds to earlier expectations for a European instrument,
and follows through on the themes of earlier announcements. It also
adopts many of the proposals made by the Financial Stability Board's
"Key Attributes." 178 Essentially, the Directive requires all E.U. Member
States (notjust the Eurozone countries) to put in place a minimum set of
172. Id. at 8-10.
173. Dirk Schoenmaker, Duisenberg School of Finance Policy Paper No. 12, The
European Banking Landscape After the Crisis 2 & fig.1 (2011), available at
http://www.dsf.nl/home/research/publications/dsf-policy-papers
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (showing increase in cross-border banking leading up to crisis); see
also Jakob de Haan, Sander Oosterloo & Dirk Schoenmaker, Financial Markets and
Institutions: A European Perspective ch. 10.3, at 302-19 (2d ed. 2012) (same).
174. See Eur. Comm'n, Bank Resolution Funds, supra note 165, at 7 ("Establishing
greater clarity and mutual understanding between authorities through more robust
financing arrangements will also be key to aligning incentives between authorities to
cooperate fully in the event of cross-border banking failure.").
175. See id. at 11 (proposing involvement of "colleges involving authorities in charge
of resolution with a view to taking joint decision on the preparation for the resolution of a
cross-border banking group").
176. See id. (noting EBA could oversee colleges); cf. Schoenmaker, supra note 173, at
17 ("The newly created European Banking Authority and the European Systemic Risk
Board have thus their work cut out.").
177. BRRD, supra note 8.
178. See text accompanying notes 157-158 (describing main elements of FSB's Key
Attributes).
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common tools and powers for their national regulators that would enable
them to avert and, where necessary, oversee the orderly failure of a
bank.179 It gives national resolution authorities powers to resolve
branches of banks based in other countries in certain circumstances, and
provides a framework for improved cooperation between relevant
national supervisory and resolution authorities. 8 ° An important feature
of the proposal is the emphasis it puts on "bail-in" as a regulatory tool.'81
Furthermore, at the end of 2012, the Commission further
consulted on a
82
similar framework for nonbank financial institutions.'
C.

Resolution in a Banking Union

1. A European Banking Union. - In a certain way, the project to
create a Banking Union in Europe has superseded the efforts to
harmonize all domestic resolution mechanisms within the E.U. The
2010-2013 sovereign debt crisis demonstrated that new strategies were
needed to overcome the dangerous links between sovereigns and their
banks. Regulators agreed that the solution required the federalization of
some important tasks, including banking supervision, resolution, and
deposit guarantee schemes. 18 3 Thus, the catchphrase for banking
regulation has become to "break the link between sovereigns and
banks."' 84 At the most basic level, the objective is to ensure "a level
playing field for the European banking industry and remove any national
biases or supervisory forbearance, and prevent the hiding of bad assetsor even leniency-towards so-called 'national champions."' 85 But the
179. Eur. Scrutiny Comm., Draft Directive Establishing a Framework for the Recovery
and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Council
Directives 77/91/EC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC,
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, 20112012,
H.C. 34012
(U.K.),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/
cmselect/cmeuleg/86-vii/86vii09.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (presenting
draft version of BRRD to U.K Parliament).
180. Id.
181. BRRD, supra note 8, arts. 43-58.
182. See Eur. Comm'n, Consultation on a Possible Framework for the Recovery and
Resolution
of Nonbank
Financial
Institutions,
http://ec.europa.eu/intemal_
market/consultations/2012/nonbanksen.htm

(on file with the

Columbia Law Review)

(last updated May 10, 2012) (noting consultation would take place from October to
December 2012).
183. See Memorandum from the Eur. Comm'n, Memo/14/294, Banking Union:
Restoring Financial Stability in the Eurozone 1-10 (Mar. 9, 2015), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-MEMO-14-294 en.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (outlining plans for Banking Union).
184. E.g., Alessandro Giovannini, Banking Union: Will the EU Manage to Break the
Link Between Sovereigns and Banks, Sovereign Debt Initiative (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://sovdebt.org/2014/01/1 7/banking-union-will-the-eu-manage-to-break-the-linkbetween-sovereigns-and-banks/ (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review).
185. Yves Mersch, Member, Exec. Bd. of the European Cent. Bank, Speech at the
Barclays Research Conference: "Built to Last": The New Euro Area Framework (May 17,
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Banking Union is supposed to go well beyond that: Its objective is to
eliminate the asset and liability matching on a national level that has
1 86
been a driver of the E.U. sovereign debt crisis.
Thus, just three weeks after the BRRD proposal, regulators in the
Euro-area summit on June 29, 2012 agreed, in principle, to establish a
full Banking Union, calling for urgent steps to implement it by the end
of the year. l8 7 Regulators envisioned a European resolution authority, a
European resolution fund funded by banks' contributions, and a fiscal
backstop in form of the (already established) European Stability Mechanism
to accompany a common supervisor and deposit insurance scheme."s As a
first step, the European Commission presented its proposals for a Single
Supervision Mechanism.18 9 In March 2013, the European Parliament and
the Council reached agreement on the SSM, envisaging a scheme that
would charge the European Central Bank with responsibility for
supervising significant banks.' 90
2. Implementing a Single Resolution Mechanism. - In parallel, E.U.
institutions began working on the second pillar of the Banking Union:

2013), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2013/html/spl3O517_1.en.html
[hereinafter Mersch, Built to Last] (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see Yves Mersch,
Member, Exec. Bd. of the European Cent. Bank, Speech at the Seminar Auf dem Weg zu
mehr Stabiltat-Ein Dialog fiber die Ausgestaltung der Bankenunion zwischen
Wissenschaft und Praxis [Towards More Stability: A Dialogue Between Science and
Practice on the Development of the Banking Union]: The Banking Union-A European
Perspective: Reasons, Benefits and Challenges of the Banking Union (Apr. 5, 2013)
[hereinafter Mersch, Banking Union], http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/
html/sp130405.en.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (outlining these benefits of
Banking Union).
186. See id. ("Neither would a European supervisor insist on national asset and
liability matching ....
").
187. See Euro Area Summit Statement, supra note 152, at 1-2 (noting it is
"imperative" to implement proposals "as a matter of urgency").
188. See Anita Millar, Int'l Regulatory Strategy Grp., EU Banking Union-Operational
Issues and Design Considerations 1 (2012), http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/
economic-research-and-information/research-publications/Documents/research2012/EU-banking-unions-final3.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (outlining
regulatory proposals).
189. European Commission, SSM Proposal, supra note 23; European Commission,
Proposal to Amend EBA Rules, supra note 23; see also Eur. Comm'n, Roadmap, supra
note 153, at 4 ("This communication accompanies two legislative proposals, respectively
for the setting up of a single supervisory mechanism by conferring specific tasks on the
ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and
for adaptations to the Regulation setting up the European Banking Authority (EBA).").
190. Barnier Press Release, supra note 23, at 1. The final instruments adopted to
create the SSM are SSM Regulation, supra note 24, and Regulation Amending EBA Rules,
supra note 24. See generally Eilis Ferran & Valia S.G. Babis, The European Single
Supervisory Mechanism, 13 J. Corp. L. Stud. 255 (2013) (detailing SSM); Eddy
Wymeersch, The Single Supervisory Mechanism or SSM, Part One of the Banking Union
(Ghent Univ. Fin. Law Inst. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2014-01, 2014), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=2403859 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same).
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resolution. In a speech in February 2013, ECB President Mario Draghi
outlined the policy objectives of the future Single Resolution Mechanism:
The Single Resolution Mechanism should be centered in a
Single Resolution Authority with a European Resolution Fund
at its disposal....
First, the Single Resolution Authority needs to dispose of a
robust resolution framework, one that provides it with
enforceable resolution tools and powers. In this respect, the
proposed bank recovery and resolution directive is key ....
Second, the Single Resolution Authority needs access to
resolution financing. It should therefore have a European
Resolution Fund at its disposal, which should be financed by the
private sector via risk-based ex ante levies. The European
Resolution Fund should be backed by a public backstop mechanism, the support of which would need to be recouped via
special ex post levies on the private sector. This means that it
would be fiscally neutral over the medium term.
Third, the Single Resolution Authority should have an
institutional set-up that allows for independence, sufficient
operational capacity and a robust accountability framework with
effective judicial protection against resolution decisions ex post.
The Commission is currently assessing the options for the
institutional anchoring of the Single Resolution Authority. 191
The Commission produced a proposal for a robust Single
Resolution Authority in July 2013. 192 This proposal did not survive the
E.U. polycentric decisionmaking process, resulting instead in a
resolution structure 9 ' that risks indecisiveness in a crisis and invites the
protection of national champions. From the outset, Germany and other
E.U. Member States preferred a "college" or "network" of national
resolution authorities to operate as the E.U. decisionmaker instead of
creating a new E.U. body. Indeed, some German government officials
raised constitutional objections. " Other Member States contended that a
new SRM required revision of the E.U. Treaties. German Finance Minister

191. Draghi, supra note 155, at 3-4 (emphasis omitted).
192. SRM Proposal, supra note 21.
193. SRM Regulation, supra note 9.
194. See Peel & Barker, supra note 27 (noting these objections). See also the analysis by
think tank Centrum fir Europaische Politik, cepAnalyse, No. 42/2013, Bankenabwicklung fOr
die SSM-Staaten (SRM) 1 (2013), available at http://www.cep.eu/Analysen/COM_2013 520
BankenabwicklungSSM-Staaten/cepAnalyseCOM_2013_520_Bankenabwicklung.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review), which argues that Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union Article 352 would be a preferable legal basis (though that would require
unanimity in Council). These constitutional concerns should have been mitigated by the
January 2014 ECJ decision, Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council
115119
(Jan.
22,
2014),
available
at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=146621&pagelndex--0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&par
t=l&cid=12829 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (sustaining ESMA's rules against shortselling).
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Wolfgang Schduble therefore suggested an alternative, two-step approach: a
coordinated network of national authorities as a first step, and the
introduction of a central E.U. resolution authority in the more distant
future, following a Treaty revision.' 95 In a similar vein, the French and
German governments adopted a joint paper in May 2013 to propose a
Single Resolution Board (SRB) that would be composed of national
resolution authorities. 1 96 In fact, they were proposing the old-style
European approach of establishing "colleges" of national bodies on the
European level, such as CESR, 19 7 due to their reluctance to relinquish
their sovereignty.
It is therefore no surprise that the Commission's July 2013 proposal
proved to be extremely controversial-the Council (representing the
Member States) sought more influence in the resolution process while
the European Parliament played its federalist foil.19 8 In April 2014, the
counterparties finally reached a compromise that was enacted into law
that summer.' 99 The legislation introduces a new centralized E.U. body, the
Single Resolution Board, which will direct the resolution process for
195. Wolfgang Schauble, Banking Union Must Be Built on Firm Foundations, Fin.
Times (May 12, 2013, 6:49 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8bdaf6e8-b89f-1le2869f-00144feabdc0.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). This suggestion was
however criticized by the European Commission and the ECB. For example, ECB
Executive Board member J6rg Asmussen swiftly rejected Schauble's proposal and called
for a timely adoption of both pillars. See Paul Carrel, ECB's Asmussen Rejects German
Finance Minister's View on Bank Union, Reuters (May 13, 2013, 5:21 PM),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/05/13/uk-ecb-bankingunion-idUKBRE94COP320130513
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Mersch, Built to Last, supra note 185
(advocating "banking union consisting of the SSM and the SRM").
196. Press Release, Prdsidence de la R6publique, France and Germany-Together for
a Stronger Europe of Stability and Growth 5 (May 29, 2013), available at
http://blogs.r.ftdata.co.uk/brusselsblog/files/2013/05/Together-for-a-stronger-Europeof-Stability-and-Growth-l.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
197. CESR was the former Committee of European Securities Regulators, a network of
national regulators. It has now been replaced by ESMA, the European Securities and
Markets Authority. ESMA In Short, ESMA, http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/esma-short
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited May 1, 2015).
198. The European Parliament claimed victory in the sense that the final compromise
"has repaired many of the serious flaws in the initial Council position." Press Release,
European Parliament, Parliament Negotiators Rescue Seriously Damaged Bank Resolution
System 1 (Mar. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release, Parliament Negotiators], available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20140319IPR39310/20140
319IPR39310_en.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
199. See SRM Regulation, supra note 9, pmbl.
24 (outlining scope of Council and
Commission's role in resolution process while leaving room for participation by national
resolution authorities); see also Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, European Parliament and
Council Back Commission's Proposal for a Single Resolution Mechanism: A Major Step
Towards Completing the Banking Union 2 (Mar. 20, 2014), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseSTATEMENT-14-77_en.htm
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing agreement, including parties' respective roles). The
looming European Parliament elections in May 2014 played a decisive role in bringing the
negotiating parties to reach a deal.
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financial institutions in the Eurozone and in other signatory E.U.
countries. 20 The SRB (presumably on recommendation of the ECB as
supervisor per the SSM) will initiate the resolution of an institution and
20 1
will be responsible for the key decisions on how it will be resolved.
However, the European Commission-purportedly for constitutional
reasons-will retain the ultimate decision on whether to resolve an
20 2
institution, usually (but not necessarily) on the proposal of the SRB.
The Council may, in exceptional circumstances, oppose the decision. 203 In
practice, though, we expect that both the Commission and the Council
would be extremely unlikely to deviate from the SRB's proposals, due to
the latter's expertise in bank resolution and the urgent circumstances that
drive a resolution decision. The SRB would then instruct a national reso24
lution authority to execute the decision.
The SRM is accompanied by a Single Bank Resolution Fund (the
"Fund"), financed by annual contributions from the banks protected by
it. 205 The target size of the Fund is 1% of covered deposits of all credit
institutions authorized in the participating Member States, currently
estimated at roughly C55 billion. 2 6 The Board would use the Fund to

200. These countries are those defined as "Participating Member States." SRM
Regulation, supra note 9, art. 4, at 24-25. The Board would be composed of a number of
permanent members as well as representatives from the Commission, the Council, the
ECB and the national resolution authorities. See id., art. 43, at 65-66.
201. See Danny Busch, Governance of the Single Resolution Mechanism
9.08-9.48
(March 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing
operation of the SRM).
202. SRM Regulation, supra note 9, art. 18, § 7, at 42-43. The reason for giving the
Commission the last word appears to stem from the constitutional principle usually
referred to as the "Meroni doctrine." This goes back to one of the early ECJ cases, Meroni
& Co. v. High Authority, which essentially put limits on the Commission's powers to
delegate discretionary authority. Case 9/56, Meroni & Co. v. High Authority, 1958 E.C.R.
135, 146-54; Case 10/56, Meroni & Co. v. High Authority, 1958 E.C.R. 157, 173-75. The
press release accompanying the proposal states: "For legal reasons, the final say could not
be with the Board." Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Commission Proposes Single Resolution
Mechanism for the Banking Union 2 (July 10, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-releaseIP-13-674_en.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In the ECJ's
recent decision upholding a delegation to ESMA, Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v.
Parliament and Council
115-119 (Jan. 22, 2014), available at http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/documentjstext=&docid=146621&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=ls
t&dir=&occ=first&part=l&cid=12829 (on file with the Columbia Law Review), the legalism
may provide a cover for a political accommodation. For more detail, see Ferran, supra
note 32, at 19-22 (discussing effect of Case C-270-12 on legal basis for SRM and Meroni
doctrine).
203. SRM Regulation, supra note 9, art. 18, §§ 7-8, at 42-43.
204. Id. art. 18, § 9, at 43.
205. See SRM Proposal, supra note 21, arts. 64-73, at 75-80 (describing constitution
and activities of the Fund).
206. The target level of the Fund is currently "a percentage of the amount of covered
deposits." SRM Regulation, supra note 9, pmbl.
105. However, the Commission will
decide whether a percentage of total liabilities of financial institutions would be "a more
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ensure the operability of the failing bank in the short run; the Commission
emphasizes that it is not a bailout fund designed to take losses. 207 The
creation of the Fund proved to be one of the most controversial aspects of
the SRM. 2°8 Such an E.U.-level federal fund raised the specter of crosssubsidy from the prudent North to the profligate South, a third rail
throughout the crisis. Other parties raised E.U. constitutional concerns.
Thus, the Commission outsourced certain aspects-in particular, details
on the transfer and mutualization of contributions to the Fund-from
the SRM Regulation into a separate, Intergovernmental Agreement
(IGA) that exists alongside the Regulation. 20 9 Twenty-six E.U. Member
States (all but Sweden and the U.K.) signed this IGA on May 21, 2014.210
Unsurprisingly, the final outcome of the SRM is a typical Brussels
compromise. The competences in the resolution process have been
allocated to several players, apparently to alleviate concerns from
opposing sides. Thus, the decision to shut down a bank involves all of the
European Central Bank, the Board of the SRM (comprising permanent
members, the Commission, the Council, the ECB, and national resolution
authorities), and the Commission. 21' National authorities will execute the
resolution, not the SRB or the Commission (although on instruction by the
latter). This may also create some leeway for national regulators to influence the resolution process. 212 These are serious but acceptable flaws.
The main problem of the negotiation outcome, however, is the resolution fund. Its target size in the region of just €55 billion is way too small,
even in the eyes of the ECB. 21 3 Consequently, the size of the Fund has

appropriate basis." Id. On the estimation of C55 billion, see SRM Proposal, supra note 21,
at 14-15.
207. SRM Proposal, supra note 21, at 13.
208. See, e.g., Benjamin Fox, Brussels on Collision Course with Germany on Banking
Union, EU Observer (Jul. 10, 2013, 6:59 PM), https://euobservercom/economic/120822
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Just as controversial is the concept of a single
bank resolution fund ... ").
209. See SRM Regulation, supra note 9, art. 1, at 21 ("The use of the Fund shall be
contingent upon the entry into force of an agreement among the participating Member
States ... ").
210. Council Document No. 8457/14, Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation of
Contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (May 14, 2014) [hereinafter IGA], available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%208457%202014%20INIT
(on file
with the ColumbiaLaw Review).
211. As explained above, in certain situations, the Commission's decision is even
subject to objection by the Council.
212. In a similar vein, see the assessment by Ferran, supra note 32, at 18-19
(discussing limits of SRM authority).
213. See John O'Donnell & Tom Krkemeier, Europe Strikes Deal to Complete
Banking Union, Reuters (Mar. 20, 2014, 8:33 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/
2014/03/20/uk-eu-bankingunion-idUKBREA2JOIW20140320 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (noting ECB's view).
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already been subject to sharp criticism. 2 14 To remedy this problem, the
European Parliament insisted that the Fund be able to borrow on the
capital market to augment its capacity. 21 5 Further, the Parliament pushed
forward the target date for full funding to eight years instead of ten years
after the SRM's coming into force by insisting on an earlier date for the
mutualization of existing national resolution schemes. 216 Despite these
changes, the Fund, as it has been adopted, cannot credibly support the
resolution of a SIFI. The capital market borrowing option is insufficientgovernments will not endorse such loans, and the Fund may be able to tap
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) only in exceptional circumstances.2 17 Finally, the eight-year transition period means that the Fund
will not have any clout at all during its first years.
In sum, we are skeptical of the credibility of the Resolution Mechanism,
in particular its financial strength. 21 8 The Banking Union's original goal
was to replace the deadly nexus between a weak bank and a weak
sovereign with a European solution that would have sufficient strength to
shut down the bank. However, the Banking Union cannot achieve this
goal without a financially strong resolution mechanism. The situation is
all the more serious as the third pillar of the Banking Union-deposit
guarantee-has been removed.
3. Deposit Insurance.- Policymakers and academics regard deposit
insurance as an important and integral part of modern financial regulation. 2 19 In particular, early common rules on deposit guarantees helped
220
drive the development of the European market for financial services.

214. Mark Wall, Deutsche Bank's chief Eurozone economist, and academic economist
Paul De Grauwe have both considered the Fund insufficient. Id.
215. See SRM Regulation, supra note 9, art. 74, at 79 ("The Board shall contract for
the Fund financial arrangements, including, where possible, public financial
arrangements .... "); see also Press Release, Parliament Negotiators, supra note 198, at 1
("[A] system will be established, before the regulation enters into force, which will enable
the bank-financed single resolution fund to borrow.").
216. See Press Release, Parliament Negotiators, supra note 198, at 1.
217. See Statement of Eurogroup and ECOFIN Ministers on the SRM Backstop (Dec.
18, 2013) [hereinafter Statement of Eurogroup and ECOFIN Ministers on the SRM
Backstop], available at http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/502738/20131218-SRMbackstop-statement.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("In the transition period,
bridge financing will be available either from national sources, backed by bank levies, or
from the ESM in line with agreed procedures.").
218. In a similar vein, see Wolfgang Mfanchau, Europe Should Say No to a Flawed
Banking Union, Fin. Times (Mar. 16, 2014, 3:14 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/
0/0e6b4800-ab67-11e3-8cae-00144feab7de.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
("Step back from this technical debate for a moment and recall why the eurozone needs a
banking union... : to prevent doubts about the solvency of national governments from
undermining confidence in their banks. Unless the resolution fund has the backstop of
further European funding, that cannot happen.").
219. See Ash DemirgfO¢-Kunt et al., Deposit Insurance Around the World: A
Comprehensive Database 2 (World Bank Pol'y Res., Working Paper No. 3628, June 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-756851 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
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The E.U. adopted its first Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes
(DGS) in 1994, achieving minimum harmonization of deposit protection
policies across Member States. 22 1 The DGS required at minimum a
modest C20,000 guaranteed by Member States. In 2009, in response to
the exigencies of the financial crisis, the E.U. raised the minimum level
to €100,000 by December 31, 2010.222 Later, the E.U. again revised the
DGS alongside the adoption of the SRM,223 with the objective of
harmonizing and simplifying protected deposits, achieving faster payouts,
and improving the financing of national deposit schemes.2 24 The revised
DGS Directive requires ex ante funding of all national systems. 2 25 The
targeted amount is 0.8% of covered deposits, to be collected from banks
over a ten-year period through fees employing a risk-based
component. 226 A recent FSB survey shows that most E.U. Member States
already comply with the requirements; 227 however, the size of insurance
funds is rather small, significantly below even the lowest target under
228
discussion during the drafting process.
Crucially, however, deposit insurance remains, even after the most
recent reforms, a predominantly national affair, As we explain above,

("Deposit insurance has become an increasingly used tool by governments in an effort to
ensure the stability of banking systems and protect bank depositors. .. "); see also Ash
Demirg0i4-Kunt et al., Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design, 17J. Fin.
Intermed. 407, 408 (2008) (assessing rationales).
220. See generally Takis Tridimas, EU Financial Regulation: Federalization, Crisis
Management, and Law Reform, in The Evolution of EU Law 783 (Paul Craig & Gniinne de
Bfirca eds., 2d. ed. 2011) (explaining development of European market for financial
services).
221. Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May
1994 on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes, 1994 O.J. (L 135) 5.
222. Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
March 2009 Amending Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes as Regards the
Coverage Level and the Payout Delay, 2009 O.J. (L 68) 3, 3.
223. Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
April 2014 on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (recast), 2014 O.J. (L 173) 149 lhereinafter
Directive 2014/49/EU].
224. See Commission Proposal for a Directive ... / ... /EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes [recast], at 2, COM (2010)
368 final (July 12, 2010).
225. See Directive 2014/49/EU, supra note 223, art. 10, § 1, at 164 (requiring at
minimum annual contributions).
226. Id. art. 10, § 2, at 164-65.
227. Ex-post-funded deposit insurance is still present in some Member States,
including Italy, the Netherlands, and the U.K.
228. Fin. Stability Bd., Thematic Review on Deposit Insurance Systems: Peer Review
Report 54 tbl.7 (Feb. 8, 2012), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wpcontent/uploads/rI20208.pdf?page-moved=l (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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original proposals to erect a third Banking Union229pillar to create a common
deposit guarantee scheme were quietly dropped.
VI. OPERATION OF OUR PROPOSAL UNDER E.U. LAw

This Part evaluates the insights gained from the analysis of the
FDIC's resolution power against the current framework present in the
E.U. as described in Part V. Part VI.A uses the FDIC analysis to develop
the main proposal for an effective banking resolution regime in the
Banking Union. Part VI.B compares this proposal against the existing
legal framework and identifies which changes and adaptations are necessary. Part VI.C summarizes the key benefits that this proposal has over the
existing regime.
A.

Key Elementsfor the FutureBanking Resolution Mechanism

Our vision for banking resolution in Europe rests on four elements.
First, it is crucial that the European Banking Union adopt and sustain a
federalized resolution procedure. Otherwise, it will not be able to resolve
a fundamental systemic weakness in the E.U. financial sector-the interconnection between sovereign capacity and bank stability. Second,
resolution can sufficiently complement supervision to form an effective
Banking Union only if the resolution authority has strong, broad powers
not subject to the veto of an interested Member State. Third, an effective
resolution mechanism for Europe's G-SIBs and other systemically important
banks will require structural reorganization of banking groups into holding
company structures. Finally, the U.S. example shows that that "bail-inable"
debt can address the funding problem as an effective form of bank selfinsurance that is particularly important in the case of G-SIBs.
1. Centralization.- Bank resolution in the European Union will be
most efficient and effective in the hands of one strong regulator. Indeed,
the capacity of the SRB to wield the BRRD powers in a way that attends to
the interest of the E.U. banking system as a whole rather than the
229. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. The Q&A section on the reformed
deposit insurance directive spells this out at a well-hidden place. The bottom of the page
reads:
Should we have a pan-European Deposit Guarantee Scheme in the EU? A panEU DGS is not currently under discussion. The text opens the way to a voluntary
mechanism of mutual borrowing between the Deposit Guarantee Schemes from
different EU countries. This is the only form of mutualisation foreseen at this
stage. The pan-European Deposit Guarantee Scheme could be a potential option
in the future once the current banking reforms (e.g. BRRD Bank Resolution and
Recovery Directive) have been implemented and the other elements of the
banking union such as the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) are in place.
Memorandum from the Eur. Comm'n on Deposit Guarantee Schemes-Frequently Asked
Questions 6 (Apr. 15, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
MEMO-14-296_en.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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interests of a particular Member State is a crucial element in the success
of the SRM. The evolution of the FDIC in the system of U.S. banking
regulation illustrates the importance of a central, unbiased, and wellfunded institution. The FDIC was created in response to weak, statebased insurance systems that could not prevent the bank failures of the
Great Depression and avoid the consequent externalities.230 Even though
the United States at the time had comparatively local banks,23 ' lawmakers
chose to federalize deposit insurance and create a federal resolution
process as the most credible way to foster systemic stability. The case for a
centralized E.U. resolution process is even stronger, given the large
number of banks operating cross-border and the well-advanced
integration of financial services in the E.U. 2 32 This simple lesson drawn
from the U.S. regime reinforces the E.U.-specific arguments in favor of
233
centralized resolution.
This principle may help resolve the controversy around the
development of the E.U. resolution mechanism and its procedures. The
initial preference of the Franco-German tandem for a resolution
"college" of national supervisors was, as described above, transmuted
into the SRB, on which the relevant national supervisors will be
represented.234 To establish the Board's autonomy, it is important for it to
develop an internal infrastructure that includes two critical elements:
well-developed administrative procedures that would apply in case of a
resolution and a staff that is capable of carrying forward a resolution or,
where that task has been delegated to national authorities, is capable of
robust monitoring to assure that the resolution is effectively
implemented. Such procedures, staff building, and practices could
constrain national protectionist impulses. Indeed, the European
Commission itself compares the SRB with the FDIC, an autonomous, selfgoverning body. 235
Centralization is not inconsistent with the retained role of national
regulators in the resolution system. The ECB's supervisory remit extends
beyond the European G-SIBs. As the U.S. experience shows, bank failures
230. Lowenstein, supra note 68 (describing failures eventually leading to creation of
FDIC).
231. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (noting pre-New Deal "banking
system was highly fragmented into relatively few large money center-banks with limited
branching and thousands of small local banks").
232. On the comparative level of cross-border penetration of banking, see
Schoenmaker, supra note 173, at 2 (noting increase in cross-border banking in Europe
since 1997). See generally de Haan, Oosterloo & Schoenmaker, supra note 173, at 303-16
(discussing structure of European banking market).
233. For example, breaking the sovereign/bank link or supplementing the SSM. See
supra Part I (arguing factors specific to Europe call for centralized banking there).
234. See supra notes 196-197 and accompanying text (discussing Franco/German
college preference).
235. See SRM Proposal, supra note 21, at 98-99 tbl.1 (providing calculations
comparing Single Resolution Board and FDIC).
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(and resolutions) are far more common for smaller banks, which do not
present systemic risks. 236 In the referral of such cases by the ECB to the
SRB, it is easy to see a useful role for national authorities in devising a
resolution solution, particularly for smaller banks. Such a solution is
likely to include some version of purchase and assumption and perhaps a
payout under deposit guarantee schemes, which are established and
administered under the laws of the Member States. On the other hand,
the SRB has an important monitoring role to play to assure uniform
compliance and application of the BRRD. In particular, this means bailin of shareholder and creditor claims per the BRRD's requirement of
convertible "gone concern" liabilities, 23 7 prior to a payout on deposit
insurance.
2. Strong Resolution Powers. - Crucially, a European resolution
authority must have complete discretion to write down debt and to
convert it to equity. The FDIC experience demonstrates that when the
resolution authority is confronted with a bank failure, it must have the
power to use these strong and credible tools, as it considers necessary, in
order to resolve the bank without causing major economic disruption. In
each case, the SRB will have to decide whether the best solution is to
restructure the failing bank as a going concern (through bail-in), to
restructure it as a gone concern (that is, through a bridge bank or a
combination of bridge bank and bail-in) or to wind it down in full or in
part. The resolution framework must enable the SRB to choose among
all of those alternatives. Such write-down powers further have to be
accompanied by the capacity for significant restructuring as necessary to
return a "new" or "bridge" bank to long-term financial viability.
3. Structural Requirements. - The Board's write-down powers can
work effectively only where two conditions are satisfied. First, the bank
that is to be resolved must have in its liability structure sufficient
subordinated term debt so that, in the event of bank failure, the conversion of debt into equity will be sufficient to absorb asset losses without

236. Over the 2007-2014 period, which included the heart of the financial crisis,
approximately 520 banks or thrifts failed in the United States. FDIC Failures and
Assistance Transactions, FDIC's Historical Statistics on Banking, https://www2.fdic.gov/
hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30&Header=1 (last visited Mar. 13, 2015) (set "State" to
"United States"; set "Effective Date (s)" to 2007 and 2014; click "Produce Report" button).
The only systemic institution to fail in the period was Lehman Brothers, which was not a
bank. TARP infusions and other assistance protected systemically important banks, less
than a dozen.
237. This is the so-called "Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible
Liabilities" (MREL). BRRD, supra note 8, art. 45, at 271-77; Eur. Banking Auth.,
Consultation Paper: Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on Criteria for Determining the
Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities Under Directive
2014/59/EU, at 6-14 (Nov. 28, 2014), available at https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/ebaconsul ts-on-criteria-for-determining-the-minimum-requirement-for-own-funds-and-eigibleliabilities-mrel- (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing background and
rationale of MREL).
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impairing deposits and other short-term credit. This is crucial to avoiding
a run that would destabilize the bank and, depending on the circumstances, create systemic financial distress. 238 Second, G-SIBs and perhaps
other significant financial institutions must be organized in such a way as
to permit debt conversion without putting core financial constituents
through a bankruptcy. 2 9 This is very important to assure the ongoing,
nondisrupted operation of important financial activity that is organized
in legally and contractually complex forms. Avoiding bankruptcy of the
operating subsidiaries also facilitates resolution of banks with important
cross-border activities; if the subsidiaries are not put into bankruptcy,
many difficult cross-border resolution problems can be avoided. 2 " The
goal, after all, in resolution of a G-SIB is to minimize own-firm losses, to
minimize other-firm losses because of systemic distress, and thus to avoid
damage to the real economy. Effective resolution also minimizes the
necessary amount of bail-inable funds. Thus, an effective central
resolution mechanism would require banks to adopt these structural
characteristics if they have not already done so. As in the United States,
this will mean a holding company structure in which the public parent
issues sufficient unsecured term debt so as (i) to cover losses at the
operating subsidiary level that, when upstreamed, exceed the company's
Tier 1 capital; and (ii) through the further conversion of the unsecured
2 41
term debt, to re-equitize the BHC.
4. Funding. Effective resolution requires a federal funding
mechanism deployable at the discretion of the resolution authority to
supply funding to a reorganizing institution. This funding is crucial for
the early operations of the new bridge bank or the reorganized firm.
Critically, this "funding" ought to be in the form of liquidity provisions at
a time when private sources are closed to the resolving bank, not a
bailout. The Banking Union should create this fund ex ante, through
levies on the financial industry. The set-up of the fund needs to negative
the suggestion that taxpayer support will sustain the losses of a failing
bank, and instead show that the fund is designed to make the threat of
resolution a credible disciplinary measure. The levies should be adjusted
on a risk-based assessment of the bank's activities-that is, banks engaged
in riskier activities would pay higher fees-geared perhaps to match the
G-SIB systemic risk surcharge.

238. See supra Part III (describing how this aspect of FDIC's SPOE plan maintains
stability and avoids systemic distress in the event of large-bank failure).
239. For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see Jeffrey N. Gordon & WolfGeorg Ringe, Bank Resolution in Europe: The Unfinished Agenda of Structural Reform
(ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, Paper No. 282, Jan. 2015), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2548251 (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review).
240. See supra Part III (describing how FDIC's resolution plan would help avoid
subsidiary bankruptcy).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92 (discussing how this procedure would
unfold under U.S. SPOE approach).
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The Single Bank Resolution Fund meets these criteria in principle,
but it is, as explained, insufficient in its target size. In the United States,
the Treasury provides a substantial credit line to the FDIC, which has
repayment priority on the assets of the resolved institution.2 42 If that is
inadequate, the credit is repaid over time through additional levies on
the financial sector. Moreover, the FDIC can guarantee obligations of the
bridge bank, backed by the full faith and credit of the United States 243 By
contrast, the current version of the Fund will have limited range to
augment its resources: It will be permitted to borrow on the capital
markets, but it will not have the backing of the E.U. Member States. 244 In
light of potentially massive liquidity needs in connection with the
resolution of a large financial institution, this setup for the Fund will not
provide a credible financial backstop. 245 It needs serious improvement.
Two steps are necessary to remedy the current design. First, the
FDIC example (funding supported by Treasury debt issuances) supports
the proposition that the SRB needs access to immediate liquidity financing from the ECB. 246 As a monetary authority, not a fiscal authority, the
ECB is not designed to bear losses (and should not be). However, though
the bail-inable debt feature of our resolution proposal is meant to provide
loss absorbency that could be extended to cover ECB advances, the Single
Bank Resolution Fund can provide an additional backstop. Specifically, the
necessary liquidity support should come through an ECB facility that is
capitalized with the Single Bank Resolution Fund. This would put the Fund
in a first-loss position, much as various Federal Reserve facilities in the
fall of 2008 were capitalized with TARP funds. 24 7 If the ECB nevertheless
242. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 210(n) (6), 124 Stat. 1376, 1507 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n) (6)
(2012)) (limiting maximum obligation for an institution to 10% of consolidated assets and
90% of fair market value of the assets post-resolution); id. § 204, 124 Stat. at 1454-56
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384(d)) (describing repayment priorities). The FDIC guarantees
of Bridgeco debt are not subject to explicit limit.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46 (describing FDIC authority under
OLA).
244. See SRM Regulation, supra note 9, art. 74, at 79 (giving Fund access to capital
markets); Chris Mallon et al., EU Banking Union: Political Agreement Reached on Single
Resolution Mechanism, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP 2-3 (Apr. 10, 2014),
http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/EU-Banking-Union-PoliticalAgreementReached onSingleResolutionMechanism.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (noting Fund's borrowing ability).
245. Cf. Int'l Monetary Fund, Cross-Border Bank Resolution: Recent Developments 10
(June 2, 2014), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/pp/eng/2014/060214.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (" [SPOE] requires... the capacity and willingness
to provide liquidity support in resolution .. ").
246. See infra text accompanying notes 273-275 (suggesting improvements to liquidity
aspect of framework).
247. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Quarterly Report on Federal Reserve
Balance Sheet Developments 17-18 (Mar. 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/files/quarterly-balancesheet-developmentsreport_201303.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (noting use of TARP funds in lending facilities).
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incurs losses, the SRB should subject the financial industry to subsequent
assessments to cover such losses. Thus, existing and contingent funding
of the Single Bank Resolution Fund should pave the way for significant
2 48
ECB liquidity provision. We will revisit this idea in more detail below.

Were these four conditions to be fulfilled, a sound and effective
resolution mechanism could operate in the E.U. Such a mechanism
would be credible even where the sovereign behind the bank is weak.
Effectively, a resolution mechanism designed along the lines described
above would lead to self-insurance of deposits rather than external deposit
insurance, thus mitigating the need for a third pillar of the Banking
Union. For this to work, the structural elements introduced above are
crucial: The SIFI's balance sheet must include a thick layer of subordinated debt with sufficient loss absorbency so that depositors and other
short-term credit providers are protected against loss. Functionally, longterm subordinated debt, not federal deposit insurance, insures the
deposits.249 This type of self-insurance is the key to avoiding destructive
runs that can produce fire sale liquidations and negative asset valuation
spirals. Additionally, the firm must be organized through a holding
company structure, with the unsecured term debt issued at the holding
company level, such that the bail-inable debt is structurally, rather than
contractually, subordinated to runnable debt at the operating subsidiary
level. The SRB could thus resolve the SIFI without putting the operating
subsidiaries through a resolution process. These features offer the greatest
possibility for a minimally disruptive, thus credible, SIFI resolution.
A resolution mechanism that ticks these boxes would obviate the need
for a separate, federal deposit insurance tool. Indeed, our "self-insurance"
proposal could be even more effective than a traditional deposit insurance
mechanism on the E.U. level, not least because it avoids the difficulties
associated with the relatively low cap of traditional deposit insurance
coverage. As noted previously, f100,000 is the current prescription;25 ° the
(once envisaged) centralized E.U. Deposit Guarantee Scheme would
probably have come out similarly. Capped deposit insurance would not
248. See infra Part VI.B.1 (discussing funding and liquidity aspect of proposal). It has
been suggested that the Fund is actually unnecessary because after the failing institution
has been recapitalized with a bail-in, the ECB could provide customary support as lender
of last resort to a solvent, functioning bank. Given the valuation uncertainties and the
importance of protecting the ECB at a moment of high stress, we believe the Fund would
be best used to provide loss absorbency for the liquidity facilities that would stabilize the
newly resolved bank as well the financial system generally.
249. Obviously, Member States would continue to provide deposit insurance on their
level.
250. Directive 2014/49/EU, supra note 223, art. 6, § 1, at 160; see also supra notes
222-223 (discussing deposit guarantee schemes in Europe).
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protect the large deposits of nonfinancial firms, wealthy individuals, or
interbank loans; nor would it protect short-term credit issuances sold on
the money market. Since such claims may well constitute the bulk of
"runnable" bank liabilities for large financial institutions, a significant
run risk would remain even with deposit insurance. By contrast, the selfinsurance approach is not capped, assuming sufficient bail-inable debt
has been required. Further, deposit insurance suffers from well-known
weaknesses such as creating moral hazard in bank risk-taking and encouraging lax monitoring by depositors.2 5 In comparison, a self-insurance
system funded by market issuances of term debt is likely to price risktaking more effectively than deposit insurance's risk-adjusted fees. As we
have outlined above, the ECB would be able to recover any losses
incurred in providing necessary post-resolution liquidity ex post. Such a
system would significantly mitigate moral hazard concerns.
B.

Adapting the Proposalto the CurrentLegal Framework

This section discusses how the existing European institutional
framework would permit a European Single Resolution Authority to use
the FDIC-like powers that we discussed above. But first, a caveat: Some
aspects of the emerging E.U. framework for bank resolution are still in
the legislative pipeline; in particular, many secondary laws, implementation measures, and delegated acts are still outstanding. Nevertheless, the
SRM Regulation as the main instrument and the accompanying IGA have
been adopted successfully. 25 2 As things stand now, it is likely that the E.U.
will fulfill (or can fulfill with only minor amendments) the first and
second principles, centralization and broad discretion. The SRM
Regulation provides the SRB as a centralized body,253 independent from the
ECB, and relatively independent from the Member States' resolution
authorities. 254 The Board will exercise responsibility to large banks only,

251. See Franklin Allen et al., Deposit Insurance and Risk Taking, 27 Oxford Rev.
Econ. Pol'y 464, 468-71 (2011) (reviewing these weaknesses); Charles W. Calomiris, Is
Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective, 50 J. Econ. Hist. 283, 293-95
(1990) (noting "problems of moral hazard and adverse selection" associated with deposit
insurance).
252. See supra Part V.C.2 (discussing adoption of the SRM and the IGA).
253. Our compromise "capital call" solution, developed above, could be introduced by
an amendment to the SRM Regulation, if deemed necessary.
254. SRM Regulation, supra note 9, arts. 42-48, at 65-67. In particular, note the
independence enshrined in Article 47. Id. art. 47, at 67; see also Yves Mersch, Member,
Exec. Bd. of the European Cent. Bank, Speech at Finanzplatztag: The European Banking
Union-First Steps on a Long March (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/
press/key/date/2013/html/sp130227_L.en.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Mersch, First Steps] (noting SRM "should under no circumstances be placed
with the ECB").
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but that would correspond to our focus on SIFIs. 255 Though the Board
may cooperate with and hand over some of its day-to-day work to national
resolution authorities (analogous to the SSM), that would be satisfactory
as long as the ultimate responsibility for and final decision of resolution
256
lies with an E.U. body.
Secondly, as to the resolution powers, the competences of the future
SRM are modeled after the powers included in the BRRD. 257 This
258
directive has been praised for its strong support for bail-in powers.
Moreover, it provides a robust and credible statutory mechanism to write
down debt. The intrajurisdictional problems associated with a contractual approach do not arise within the Banking Union, as the authority
would be exercised by an E.U. body in accordance with E.U. law. 25 9 As to
bonds subject to a non-E.U. jurisdiction, the BRRD follows the preferred
"hybrid" approach. 260 As to the scope of the bail-in tool, the BRRD lists a
number of eligible types of liabilities, which seems broadly in line with
26 1
our reflections.
1. Inadequate Funding in the Current Regime. - Despite a clear path
toward centralization and robust powers, funding of the Resolution
Mechanism remains a critical and often contentious issue among Member
States.26 2 Whereas political economy considerations suggest that policy255. The SRB will effectively only take responsibility for those banks that will be
subject to ECB supervision under the SSM. See SRM Regulation, supra note 9, arts. 2, 7, at
21, 26-27 (providing for scope of entities under authority of SRB).
256. According to the SRM Regulation, national authorities carry out the decisions by
the SRB and may be specifically ordered to implement SRB decisions. See id. art. 18, § 9,
at 43 ("The Board shall ensure that the necessary resolution action is taken to carry out
the resolution scheme by the relevant national resolution authorities."); id. art. 29, at 5657 (placing national resolution authorities under direction of the Board). Even outside its
scope, the SRB may ultimately take over responsibility from noncomplying national
resolution authorities. See id. Art. 7, § 4(b), at 27.
257. SRM Regulation, supra note 9, arts. 23-29, at 50-57 (referring often to BRRD in
outlining resolution scheme and various tools); see Mersch, Banking Union, supra note
185 ("The set-up of the SRM depends on the swift adoption of the Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive, containing a harmonised toolkit of resolution powers.").
258. See Thomas Huertas & Maria J. Nieto, A Game Changer: The EU Banking
Recovery and Resolution Directive, VoxEu (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.voxeu.org/
article/banking-recovery-and-resolution-directive (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(praising bail-in powers as shifting burdens from taxpayers to investors); see also Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer, Key Points from the EU Recovery and Resolution Directive 2 (Mar. 2013),
http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/NewsRoom/Insight/RRP/EU%20
Directive%20key%20points.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting wide "scope
of liabilities subject to the bail-in tool").
259. See, on such legal problems for national bail-in tools, Chris Bates & Simon
Gleeson, Legal Aspects of Bank Bail-ins, 5 L. & Fin. Mkts. Rev. 264, 269-70 (2011).
260. See id. at 270 (" [T]he most robust approach would be a hybrid approach.").
261. BRRD, supra note 8, art. 44.
262. See Wim Fonteyne et al., Crisis Management and Resolution for a European
Banking System 61 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/10/70, Mar. 2010),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wplO70.pdf (on file with the Columbia
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makers struggle to justify new funding financed by the taxpayer, voters
may respond more favorably to resolution funding that comes directly
from the financial industry. As we have seen above, 263 the emerging
framework introduces a funding framework in line with these expectations.
The Banking Union framework sets up a Single Bank Resolution Fund,
264
which is to be financed by risk-based, ex ante levies on the industry.
The plan is to build up the Fund over several years to a target level of 1%
of covered deposits in the banking system.2 65 On the basis of 2011 data,
this would correspond to roughly C55 billion. 266 Where the Fund is not
big enough to cover the costs of a bank rescue, the Commission proposes
to collect ex post contributions from the financial industry. 267 Where
even ex post funding is not sufficient or readily available, the Fund
should, according to the SRM Regulation, engage in borrowing from
268
third parties.
We do not believe that the target size of €55 billion is sufficient for
the SRM to efficiently resolve a large failed financial institution. 269 The
Crisis proved that the financial support required to sustain a large,
systemically important global financial institution is a multiple of that
amount-it would be in the region of C500 billion or more, to be readily
available on the "critical Monday morning" after the typical, decisive rescue
weekend when the institution reopens its doors.270 Funds on that scale will

Law Review) ("[T]he cost-effective resolution of a failing bank is likely to require
significant gross financing."). On the funding of the BRRD, see MarfaJ. Nieto & Gillian G.
Garcia, The Insufficiency of Traditional Safety Nets: What Bank Resolution Fund for
Europe? 17-27 (London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci. Fin. Mkts. Grp., Special Paper No.
209, May 2012), http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/workingPapers/specialPapers/PDF/SP209.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
263. See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing emergence of BRRD).
264. See Mersch, First Steps, supra note 254 (proposing this method of funding for
the Fund). Some aspects of the Fund are regulated in the SRM Regulation, supra note 9,
arts. 67-79, at 76-81. The other aspects are detailed in the separate intergovernmental
agreement. IGA, supra note 210.
265. SRM Regulation, supra note 9, art. 69, § 1, at 77.
266. SRM Proposal, supra note 21, at 14-15.
267. SRM Regulation, supra note 9, art. 71, at 78 ("Where the available financial
means are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the use of
the Fund in resolution actions, extraordinary ex-post contributions from the institutions
authorised in the territories of participating Member States shall be raised, in order to
cover the additional amounts."); see also id.
78, at 15 (noting in some circumstances
Fund may raise ex post contributions).
268. Id. arts. 73-74, at 79.
269. In a similar vein, experts have criticized the resolution fund as a "paper tiger."
See Benjamin Fox, Eurozone Bank Fund Needs Credit Line, Draghi Says, EU Observer
(Sept. 24, 2013, 9:28 AM), http://euobserver.com/economic/121545 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
270. See Mats Persson & Raoul Ruparel, The Eurozone Banking Union: A Game of
Two Halves, OpenEurope 11 (2012), http://archive.openeurope.org.uk/Content/
Documents/Pdfs/bankinguniontwohalves.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)

2015]

BANK RESOLUTION

1359

not be covered by a fund that is made up of annual contributions. A
central bank is the only credible funder.2 1 In fact, one lesson from the
U.S. experience is that a resolution funding mechanism exclusively drawing
upon funds provided by the banking sector alone is unlikely to be
sustainable in the long run. 27 2 Unsurprisingly, Jack Lew, U.S. Secretary of
the Treasury, openly
has criticized the planned resolution fund as being
273
insufficiently small.
Thus, policymakers must reconsider the funding side of the SRM.
We would assign the primary role of providing liquidity to the restructuring process to the ECB, the only player with access to unlimited funds.
We therefore envision an ECB liquidity facility that is specifically designed for this purpose as a credible backstop for resolution funding. At
the same time, the ECB must be prohibited from taking losses: What is
required is quick access to liquidity without loss-bearing obligation. 274 To
("We estimate, in a 'business as usual' scenario, a resolution fund to be at least €500bn to
be convincing.").
271. See id. (" [T] he key for a functioning resolution fund is to have access to liquidity
when a crisis hits. This would have to come in the form of direct line to the ECB or
national treasuries.").
272. The following has been described as a "major lesson[]" learned from the U.S.
experience:
[I]t is extremely unlikely that a privately (bank) funded deposit insurance
scheme can survive a period of systemic or contagious bank failures as occurred
during the 1980s in the US during a real estate crisis or in the recent 2008-2009
crisis. In both cases, government intervention was required either through lines
of credit to the fund being drawn upon or outright bailouts by the US Treasury
of large failing insolvent banks as reflected in the $100 billion plus bailout of the
10 largest US banks in the initial stage of the 2008 TARP.
Anthony Saunders, Regulatory Experience in the US and Its Lessons for European
Banking Union 7 (Nov. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2353545 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
273. James Fontanella-Khan, European Parliament Challenges Plan for €55bn Bank
Rescue Fund, Fin. Times (Jan. 16, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/
7cld0dda-7ecO-11e3-8642-00144feabdcO.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review),
quotes Mr. Lew as saying: "We don't think it's big enough. We don't think it's fast enough."
274. The SRM proposal assigns both roles to the proposed Single Resolution Fund:
The primary objective of the Single Resolution Fund is to ensure financial
stability, rather than to absorb losses or provide capital to an institution under
resolution. The Fund should not be considered as a bailout fund. There might
be however exceptional circumstances where, after sufficiently having exhausted
the internal resources (at least 8% of the liabilities and own funds of the
institution under resolution), the primary objective could not be achieved
without allowing the Fund to absorb those losses or provide the capital. It is only
in these circumstances when the Fund could act as a backstop to the private
resources.
SRM Proposal, supra note 21, at 13. Contrast, for example, the position of the European
Banking Federation (EBF):
[T]he EBF firmly believes that the princip[al] tool for absorbing losses and
recapitalising restructured banks is bail-in and not the SRE The level of
outstanding senior unsecured long-term debt currently held by banks-around
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this end, the currently agreed-upon SRM Fund could be made useful and
operational by capitalizing such an ECB facility.
The proposed setup would protect the ECB from loss-taking on
three different levels: First, as argued previously, the strong level of bailinable debt at the Topco level would effectively absorb all losses in most
cases; additional financial resources would normally not be required.
Nevertheless, the modest Resolution Fund (which can be bolstered by
borrowing on the capital markets) could serve as a second line of
defense, as it flows into the ECB liquidity facility. Such a setup would put
the Resolution Fund in a first-loss position, much as the various Federal
Reserve facilities in fall of 2008 were capitalized with TARP funds. In the
unlikely event of losses, the ECB would recoup funds from the financial
industry, similar to the SRM approach for the replenishment of the
Resolution Fund.

275

At an earlier stage of the policy debate, lawmakers had envisioned
the former bailout-fund European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to serve as
a credible backstop for resolution funding. 276 This would not be far from
its task to directly recapitalize banks as originally promised as a reward
277
for the establishment of an effective single supervisory mechanism.
Under the final framework, the ESM will now only serve as a transitional
backstop until the Fund has reached its full target size. 278 Apart from the
ECB's much greater clout, the use of ECB liquidity rather than the ESM
would have the additional advantage that the use of ESM funds is subject
to decisionmaking by the Eurozone Finance Ministers, and the support

C1.1 trillion-is 20 times the size proposed for the SRF. Bail-in would absorb all
or most of the cost of a bank failure in most circumstances.
Eur. Banking Fed'n, EBF Positioning on the Principles Underlying the Single Resolution
Mechanism 2 (Sept. 17, 2013),
available at http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/uploads/
EBF%20Position%20on%2Single%20Resolution%20Mechanism%20v7%20final.pdf (on
file with the ColumbiaLaw Review).
275. See SRM Regulation, supra note 9, art. 71, at 78 (describing ability of board to
assess ex post levies on banks to recoup losses).
276. See ConstAncio, supra note 39 (" [T] he creation of a common backstop is already
underway with the on-going discussions on direct bank recapitalisation by the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM)."). Constancio further stated: "In the longer term, the fiscal
backstop to the Banking Union could perhaps replicate the successful arrangements we
see in the U.S. where the Treasury provides a credit line to the FDIC, which is repaid over
time through additional levies on the financial sector." Id.; see also Asmussen, supra note
22, at 3 ("The first backstop for any capital needs will of course be the market, and for the
time being national budgets and the existing ESM facilities will form the second and third
line of defence.").
277. See Euro Area Summit Statement, supra note 152, at 1 ("When an effective single
supervisory mechanism is established, involving the ECB, for banks in the euro area the
ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks
directly.").
278. See Statement of Eurogroup and ECOFIN Ministers on the SRM Backstop, supra
note 217 ("In the transition period, bridge financing will be available ... from the ESM in
line with agreed procedures.").
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of (most members of) this group is necessary to provide funds in any
given case.27 9 Thus, in political terms, there is a higher threshold for
using the ESM as compared to ECB funding. Moreover, the separate
decisionmaking process of the Ministers makes the ESM an unlikely
source of immediate massive liquidity required by an SRB intervention. A
related issue is that the ESM as currently structured would not be able to
provide funds to non-Eurozone Member States that have opted to join
the Banking Union. In order to do that, a change of the ESM Treaty
would be required.
The bottom line is that we see ECB funding as the only credible
resolution backstop. This would not, however, make the current
Resolution Fund redundant. Quite the contrary: The Fund provides
critical support for the ECB's liquidity facility, protecting the ECB against
losses. The combination of a relatively modest resolution Fund with
unlimited central-bank funding could be the best of both worlds:
Together, they would fulfill the need for credibility of the resolution
mechanism, shield the ECB from loss-bearing, and guarantee the
involvement of the financial industry.
2. Avoiding a Bailout via Structural Reform. - Let us summarize the
argument thus far. The original E.U.-level response to the crisis was a
bailout, with the ESM playing an analogous role to TARP in recapitalizing the financial system. However, the political constraints on the
ESM (and the linkage to sovereign financial stability) made it less
effective in that regard. Post-crisis reform has focused on avoiding bailouts by providing a credible resolution mechanism for systemically important financial institutions in which losses are borne by creditors
instead of the taxpayers. Such a mechanism has two important elements.
First, the resolving authority or central bank must have the capacity to
provide sufficient financial support to the failed financial institution
during the reorganization period. This has been addressed through a
refashioned role for the Single Bank Resolution Fund in conjunction
with the ECB's necessary role. Second, there must be a mechanism in
place to recapitalize the failed firm through self-insurance, in the form of
bail-in of unsecured term debt. Obviously, the level of bail-inable debt is
crucial-but so is the ex ante structure of the firm and its balance sheet.
The goal is to devise a structure that makes bail-in credible while
280
minimizing systemic distress costs arising from the resolution.
The first of these two elements, the level of bail-inable debt, is now
the subject of the FSB's proposal at the November 2014 summit of G-20
leaders for "Total Loss Absorbency Capacity" (TLAC) (roughly, equity
279. See The Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Mar. 25, 2011,
T/ESM 2012-LT/en [hereinafter ESM Treaty], available at http://www.esm.europa.eu/
pdf/ESM%20Treaty%20consolidated%2003-02-2015.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
280. See supra Part VI.B.1 (proposing new funding model that would minimize
systemic distress costs).
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plus subordinated term debt) scaled to at least twice the amount 2of
8
required equity capital on both risk-weighted and leverage measures. '
The required level of TLAC for each firm will vary, depending on the
particular institution, from at least 16% up to 25% of risk-weighted
assets. 28 2 In effect, each firm will "pre-fund" its resolution costs. By taking
taxpayers off the hook in recapitalizing the failed firm, the TLAC
requirement will make the resolution threat more credible as well as
reduce the knock-on effects from the resolution of any particular firm.
Ultimately, the internationally agreed-upon standard should be integrated
into E.U. law through modification of the BRRD. The BRRD already
includes a provision that requires banks to "meet, at all times, a
283
minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities" (MREL).
The EBA is to draft technical standards for the calculation of these
required liabilities, but ultimately the Member States will fix the required
figures. 284 Presumably the ECB will monitor compliance with the E.U.
standard as part of its supervisory duties to assure that each SIFI
maintains a sufficient amount of unsecured term debt subject to bail-in
285
powers.
The structural reform of E.U. G-SIBs is not now on the agenda but
needs to be. Systemically important European banks, typically organized

281. FSB, Adequacy of Loss-Absorbing Capacity, supra note 108, at 6-8.
282. Id. at 13. The threshold limits were based on calculation of losses during the recent
financial crisis in an earlier consultation document. See FSB Steering Committee Memo,
supra note 112, app. at 26-31.
Some might question why TLAC should consist of term debt, structurally or
contractually subordinated, rather than equity, since equity is unambiguously loss-absorbing
whereas debt is loss-absorbing only through operation of law. There are at least three reasons.
First, term debt will be cheaper than equity, both because of clientele effects as well as the
tax preference for debt. Some financial intermediaries that can hold a bank's term debt
may be unable or unwilling to hold equity either because of practical portfolio needs
(matching payout obligations with term liabilities) or legal reasons (constraints on holding
equity vs. debt). The tax preference for debt is a separate (private) cost-reducer. Second,
debt and equity will trade differently in ways that will provide regulators and other
observers with useful signals. Changes in market prices unrelated to interest-rates and
credit default swap spreads will reflect useful assessments by market participants of the
bank's solvency. Third, bail-in of term debt will effect an ownership change; existing
shareholders are replaced by post-conversion shareholders; presumably new directors are
installed. This is a more dramatic "resolution" than just the dismissal and replacement of
senior managers following a regulator's determination that the equity has fallen below a
target level and may give current equity holders stronger incentives to monitor against
excessive risk-taking.
283. BRRD, supra note 8, art. 45, § 1, at 271.
284. BRRD, supra note 8, art. 45, § 6, at 272-73.
285. See a similar comment by British Bankers' Ass'n (BBA), BBA Briefing: European
Commission's
Draft
Recovery
and
Resolution
Directive
4
(Aug.
2012),
https://www.bba.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/BBA01-401138-vl-BBA Briefing__Recovery ResolutionDirective-2.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("[W]e
suggest the resolution authority should be under a duty to ensure that each institution
maintains a sufficient amount of bail-inable liabilities.").
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as "universal banks," 286 have a complex organizational structure in which
various financial services are provided by divisions of the bank or
through subsidiaries of the bank.2 87 Furthermore, as recent research
suggests, the divergence and the complexity of most E.U. banks'
structure is such that it is virtually impossible to even depict their organizational structure. 288 Putting an operating bank or some other operating
financial entity through a resolution procedure will have unpredictable
effects on the solvency of its subsidiaries and other affiliates and will have
unpredictable effects on the claims of various credit suppliers, counterparties, and customers of the bank or affiliated financial firm. 289 Such
uncertainty is the trigger for a destructive spiral that will destroy value for
the bank under resolution with knock-on effects for the financial system.
Moreover, bail-in will work haphazardly in such a structure. Where
exactly is the loss-absorbing debt to be stationed? Will that match up with
the entity (or entities) that are put in resolution? Since the bail-in debt is
issued by an operating subsidiary, its loss-absorbing quality relative to
286. On the European universal banking model, see Jordi Canals, Universal Banking:
International Comparisons and Theoretical Perspectives 6-11 (1997). The typical U.S.
"holding company" group model is not popular on the European side of the Atlantic.
Liikanen Report, supra note 12, at 137; see also Inst. of Int'l Fin., Making Resolution
Robust-Completing the Legal and Institutional Frameworks for Effective Cross-Border
Resolution of Financial Institutions 52 (2012), available at https://www.iif.com/file/
5160/download?token=tKH8xs-E (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting holding
company model "is not uncommon in the United States"); Bob Penn, Single Point of
Entry Resolution: A Milestone for Regulators: A Millstone for Banks?, Allen & Overy,
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Irrfs/uk/Pages/Single-point-of-entryresolution.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 12, 2015)
("Outside of the U.S., many banking groups do not have bank holding companies .
).
287. SeeJames R. Barth et al., Banking Structure, Regulation, and Supervision in 1993
and 2013: Comparisons Across Countries and Over Time, 13J. Int'l Bus. & L. 231, 251-54
tbl.4 (2014) (illustrating differences in bank structure across jurisdictions); James R. Barth
et al., Commercial Banking Structure, Regulation, and Performance: An International
Comparison tbls.5, 6a, 6b (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Working Paper No.
97-6, 1997), www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/economics-working-papers/
1999-1993/working-paper-1997-6.html (click "Tables") (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (reviewing bank regulations across various jurisdictions); World Bank, Bank
Regulation and Supervision (2011), http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037-pagePK:64214825-piPK64214943
theSitePK:469382,00.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated 2012)
(providing database to survey banks and regulatory agencies across many different
countries); see also Richard J. Herring & Anthony M. Santomero, The Corporate
Structure of Financial Conglomerates, 4 J. Fin. Services Res. 471, 481-89 (1990)
(comparing various models of corporate structure); Richard Herring & Jacopo Carmassi,
The Corporate Structure of International Financial Conglomerates: Complexity and Its
Implications for Safety and Soundness, in The Oxford Handbook of Banking 195, 217-21
(Allen N. Berger et al. eds., 1st ed. 2010) (describing implications of banks' complex
corporate structures for stability)
288. See Liikanen Report, supra note 12, at 52 (discussing complexity of European
banking institutions).
289. Cf. text accompanying notes 84-106 (discussing difficulty of Lehman bankruptcy
because of complexity of structure).
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other debt claims will be a product of careful drafting of subordination
clauses; the inevitable gaps and ambiguities may be the subject of
dispute, which also will inject destabilizing uncertainty.
The alternative is a single-point-of-entry (SPOE) system like the
FDIC has fashioned for the United States. This approach, which pivots
290
off a holding company structure, has a number of distinct advantages.
First, SPOE resolution is more transparent and credible, as the bailinable debt at the holding company level is earmarked and effectively
available for regulatory activation. Because only the holding company is
put in resolution, there is no question but that the holding company debt is
structurally subordinated to the debts of the operating subsidiaries, which
are not in resolution. Secondly, SPOE works much better in cross-border
situations, facilitating an effective regulatory solution by one resolution
authority and bundling the responsibility in one center of control. It
reduces the risk that regulators in various jurisdictions will race to grab
assets for the purpose of protecting national creditors. 291 Finally, and
most importantly, the SPOE approach ensures that the operating subsidiaries can carry on their business and thus avoids fatal disruptions, destructive runs that can produce fire sale liquidations, negative asset valuation spirals, and other knock-on effects. An SPOE resolution offers the
promise of minimizing overall creditor losses, which in turn will reduce
the level of TLAC required to achieve systemic stability.
However, the structure of European banks must change in order for
the SPOE strategy to be effective. The E.U. is in the midst of a structural
exercise that currently focuses on a version of the Volcker Rule's separation of proprietary trading from banking and, additionally, that would
break out the trading activity that remains permissible into a separately
capitalized subsidiary. These structural reforms are reflected in a Proposed

290. In most recent policy initiatives, SPOE is given preference over the competing
"Multiple Points of Entry." See, e.g., FINMA, supra note 4, at 8 (noting multiple-point-ofentry bail-in "would not be viable due to the lack of decentralised funding and the fact
that the foreign subsidiaries do not have sufficient and appropriate liabilities outside the

confines of the group to be used in the bail-in"); Gruenberg, Remarks to the Volcker
Alliance Program, supra note 5, at 5 (arguing SPOE is a "viable strategy"); FDIC & Bank of
England, supra note 6, at 1 3 (noting multiple-points-of-entry strategy will occasionally
be more feasible); European Parliament, Directorate Gen. for Internal Policies, Banking
Union: The Single Resolution Mechanism 56 (Feb. 2013), http://www.europar.europa.eu/
(on file
document/activifies/cont/201304/20130422AT64861/20130422ATT64861EN.pdf
with the Columbia Law Review) (concluding SPOE is a much stronger strategy). For a
helpful overview on "regulatory inputs so far," see Scope Ratings, Holding Companies:
The Right Vehicle for European Banks' SPE Resolution? 4-5 (2014), available at
http://www.scoperatings.com/study/download?id=c2da6224-faO8-491 c-aed293fa2de5eebe&q=1 (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review).
291. See European Parliament, Directorate Gen. for Internal Policies, supra note 290,
at 13 (noting that more recently, "an increasing number of EU Member States... [have]
force [d] subordinated creditors of failing banks to incur losses").
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Structural Measures Regulation, 292 a reworking of structural reform proposals initially made in the Liikanen Report in 2012.293 In our view, the
missing organizational element is to require firms to move to a holding
company structure in which unsecured term debt is issued by the parent
and short-term debt obligations are issued only by operating subsidiaries.
Such a structure would permit bail-in without triggering a run and
without putting core financial constituents through a bankruptcy.
We see three alternative regulatory mechanisms that could achieve
this result. First, the Structural Measures Regulation could be modified
to require a holding company structure for G-SIBs, with appropriate
placement of the critical elements of TLAC. Second, the ECB as
supervisor could insist on such a holding company structure for G-SIBs as
part of its duties under the BRRD to insist on a "living will" that will
facilitate orderly resolution of such firms. 9 4 Third, the ECB (or the
European Banking Authority) could impose capital charges on G-SIBs
that do not adopt a holding company form, in light of the additional
systemic risk such firms present, as contemplated by the Capital
Requirements Regulation and Directive (CRR/CRD WY)under the Basel
III framework.2 95
Using differential capital charges is an incentives-based approach.
Critics may take exception, arguing that in deciding whether to
reorganize to avoid the extra capital charge, firms may insufficiently
internalize the systemic risk of their failure or, indeed, may see their
unresolvability as the ultimate bail-out trump.2 96 On the other hand, if
292. Eur. Comm'n, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Structural Measures Improving the Resilience of EU Credit Institutions, COM
(2014) 43 final (Jan. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Eur. Comm'n, Structural Measures Proposal].
293. Liikanen Report, supra note 12, at 99-107 (outlining proposal for structural
reforms). The Liikanen Report itself followed the U.K. ring-fencing proposal made in
the Independent Commission on Banking Final Report (September 2011), commonly
called the "Vickers Report," after its chair. Indep. Comm'n on Banking, Final Report
(2011), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131003105424/https:/
hmtsanctions.s3.amazonaws.com/ICB%20fina%20report/ICB%252Final%252Report%5B
1%5D.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
294. See supra notes 136, 170 and accompanying text (explaining how living-wills
requirements obligate banks to plan for failure).
295. Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26June
2013 on Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of
Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Amending Directive 2002/87/EC and Repealing
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338 (CRD IV); Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 on
Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1 (CRR).
296. In other words, SIFIs will not be interested in "opting in" into an SPOE
resolution scheme precisely because they anticipate that the complexity and uncertainty of
alternative resolution strategies (such as "Multiple Points of Entry") will be a barrier to
resolution and therefore increase the chance for bail-out rather than bail-in. This
argument is similar to banks' incentives to remain "too big" or "too interconnected" to
fail.
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mandatory legislation is not possible, incentives may work. Switzerland
could serve as an example in this context. Recently adopted Swiss rules
on banks' capital requirements lower those requirements for banks that
adjust their organizational structure to make the bank more easily
resolvable. This move has prompted the two Swiss SIFIs (UBS and Credit
Suisse) to change their structure in a way similar to the U.S. holding
company structure. 297 Once the new structure is in place, Credit Suisse
plans to issue ample bail-inable debt from its group holding company, in
order to facilitate the SPOE approach.2 8 Following new regulation in the
U.K., British banks are also beginning to issue debt at the holding
company level.299
The soundness of our approach is confirmed by and would go hand in
hand with the Basel accord. Basel III imposes additional capital requirements for G-SIBs, the precise extent of which will depend on various predictors for systemic risk creation (e.g., the bank's size or its interconnectedness).30 Banking structure could (and should) play a role in this
context, as structural choices significantly affect the costs and thus the
credibility of bank resolution. Adoption of a holding company structure
and other elements that would facilitate the SPOE strategy should count
significantly in the systemic risk "mark-up." Put differently, if legislation is
not available and an outright administrative mandate seems too tough
for the ECB at this early stage of its supervisory mission, our idea might
best be implemented by charging additional capital for a structure that
would not facilitate the SPOE resolution approach.
C.

Key Advantages of Our Solution

To be sure, every new direction in the architecture of international
financial regulation is costly, and requiring European banks to change
297. James Shotter, Credit Suisse to Overhaul Structure, Fin. Times (Nov. 21, 2013,
10:16 AM), http://www.ft.com/ind/cms/s/0/45d5a706-527d-Ile3-8586-OO144feabdcO.html
[hereinafter Shotter, Credit Suisse] (on file with the Columbia Law Review); James Shotter,
Swiss Bank Creditors Face Bail-in Risk, Fin. Times (Aug. 8, 2013, 1:37 A.M.),
http://www.ft.com/ind/cms/s/O/48ab28aO-ff6e-1le2-919a-OO144feab7de.html
(on file
with the Columbia Law Review). According to rating agency Fitch, it is likely that other
European banks are under pressure to follow the example. Shotter, Credit Suisse, supra;
see also James Shotter, UBS Plans Dividend as Part of Overhaul to Ease a Crisis Break-up,
Fin. Times (May 6, 2014, 2:29 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7c5ffa50-d4d8-11e38f77-00144feabdc0.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("UBS is to overhaul its
legal structure to make it easier to break up the bank in a crisis, in a move designed to
lower its capital requirements and enable it to pay a special dividend.").
298. Shotter, Credit Suisse, supra note 297.
299. Sam Fleming, Banks Address "Too Big to Fail" Question with Debt Shift, Fin.
Times (Dec. 26, 2013, 12:20 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/df877896-6c7e-1le3-ad3600144feabdc0.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
300. On the CRD IV implementation, see Memorandum from Eur. Comm'n on
Capital Requirements-CRD IV/CRR-Frequently Asked Questions (July 16, 2013),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-MEMO-13-690-en.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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their structure of operation would entail significant costs. 3° ' Nevertheless,
we believe that our solution would have a number of key advantages that
would far outweigh these costs, especially in comparison to the currently
proposed system of banking resolution in the E.U.
(1) First, our proposal would produce a much more effective
resolution process within the European Banking Union, and at much
lower costs. If a SIFI has in its liability structure sufficient unsecured term
debt, in the event of bank failure the conversion of debt into equity will
be sufficient to absorb asset losses without impairing deposits and other
short-term credit. The advantage of targeting resolutions at the holding
company level is that the operating subsidiaries of the banking group can
carry on and will not be disrupted. Further, this self-insurance approach
would avoid fire sales and contagion and thus dramatically reduce the
overall costs of a bank failure, as evidenced by the Clearing House simulation exercise and FDIC projections of a Lehman resolution via
30 2
SPOE.
(2) Second, a banking resolution pillar strengthened in this way
would make the Banking Union operational even without the third pillar,
a federal deposit guarantee scheme. That is, our concept of "self"insurance would make the Banking Union altogether less dependent on
"state" insurance. As previously discussed, the current political situation
in Europe means that a fully-fledged Banking Union with all three pillars
is likely out of the question. In this political deadlock, a self-insurance
resolution mechanism would overcome the sensitive issue of mutualization of debt. From a political economy perspective, a proposal that
requires SIFIs to self-insure against failure and engage in structural
reform should also be much easier to sell to the ordinary voter than an
expensive state-financed resolution process, deposit insurance, or bailout
programs.
(3) Finally, a self-insured SIFI resolution mechanism along the lines
we suggest would ensure that financial institutions can be resolved
without difficulty on a global stage. The global market requires transatlantic, if not global, responses to the problem of failing banks. 30 3 The
SPOE approach would facilitate cross-border resolution on a worldwide
scale far better than the current project does. Regulators worldwide have
confirmed that they prefer the SPOE strategy to the multiple-point-ofentry approach. The Swiss banking watchdog FINMA has recently
expressed its preference for an SPOE system, as have the German BaFin,
and the Bank of England and the FDIC in a joint statement.30 4 The
alternative MPOE approach would require cooperation and joint action
301. See Penn, supra note 286 ("There is also a transitional cost in terms of the higher
risk premium for new holding company debt.").
302. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (describing this simulation).
303. Barnier, The EU and US, supra note 1.
304. See supra note 290 (citing approval of SPOE approach by various authorities).

1368

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:1297

of several regulators, which would create information problems and
follow-up costs: essentially, the SIFI would fragment during a resolution
process. To be sure, the SPOE approach is essentially built on mutual
trust: accepting that the regulator responsible for the holding company
will be equipped and willing to deal with the entire financial group in an
adequate way.10 5 Although some progress has been made, full trust still
has not been achieved, as evidenced by the fact that U.S. regulators have
required foreign banks to operate in the United States through
intermediate holding companies.3 0 1 We find these concerns legitimate
under the current circumstances. On a more optimistic note, one could
argue that were there a credible European resolution regime in placesuch as the one suggested here-the regulatory concerns toward the
domestic operation of foreign banks would disappear. For example, the
30 7
requirement to establish an IHC could then be abandoned.
CONCLUSION

This paper develops a way forward for the project to create a European
Banking Union, and looks across the Atlantic for inspiration. As U.S.
banking history bears many similarities with the current salient issues in
Europe, the U.S. experience provides legitimate and valuable lessons. 308
Our central argument is that the E.U. should adopt an approach
comparable to the strategy devised by the FDIC to implement the
"Orderly Liquidation Authority" under Dodd-Frank. Such an approach
can overcome the lack of enthusiasm for adequate funding of a resolution mechanism and the unlikelihood of a federal deposit insurance
system. We offer a route by which a Banking Union can live without a
truly robust resolution fund and without centralized deposit insurance.
305. William C. Dudley, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Remarks at the Tenth Asia-Pacific High Level Meeting on Banking Supervision: Global
Financial Stability-the Road Ahead (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.newyorkfed.org/
newsevents/speeches/2014/dud140226.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
306. 12 C.F.R. § 252.153 (2012); see also Fed. Reserve Sys., Enhanced Prudential
Standards for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banking Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg.
13,498 (Mar. 11, 2014); Tarullo, Regulating Large Foreign Banking Organizations, supra
note 7 (explaining IHCs "must meet the risk-based and leverage capital standards
generally applicable to bank holding companies under U.S. law").
307. In a similar move, the draft Liikanen implementation would give the ECB the
power to exempt foreign subsidiaries of E.U. banks from E.U. ring-fencing requirements,
provided that a sufficiently robust group-level resolution strategy between the foreign
country and the E.U. exists. See Eur. Comm'n, Structural Measures Proposal, supra note
292, art. 4, § 2, at 23.
308. Geoffrey Miller, Presentation at the 2012 Transatlantic Corporate Governance
Dialogue: America's Dual Banking System: Lessons for Europe? (Dec. 17, 2012), available
at http://www.ecgi.org/tcgd/2012/presentations.php (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Saunders, supra note 272, at 15 ("[T]he US is a useful laboratory to examine the
benefits and costs of different approaches to the three 'legs' of European bank union, i.e.,
supervision, deposit insurance and restructuring/resolution.").
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European SIFIs should instead "self-insure"; that is, they should hold
sufficient bail-inable debt at the Topco level. This would require three
important preconditions: first, that systemically important institutions
have in their liability structure sufficient subordinated term debt so that
in the event of bank failure, the conversion of debt into equity will be
sufficient to absorb asset losses without impairing deposits and other
short-term credit; second, that the organizational structure of the
financial institution will permit such a debt conversion without putting
core financial constituents through bankruptcy; and third, that centralbank funding deployable at the discretion of the resolution authority will
be available to supply liquidity to a reorganizing bank. On these conditions, a resolution fund and deposit insurance both play a subsidiary role
in resolution. What is more, such a "self-insurance" model would even
have a number of advantages over the traditional deposit guarantee
approach.
These conceptual ideas can be adapted into the current E.U.
framework by modifying enacted and proposed rules. A centralized E.U.
resolution authority with wide discretionary powers would be key to our
approach. Further, we would propose changes to the proposed Structural
Measures (Liikanen) Regulation or various supervisory measures that
would provide a path for E.U. G-SIBs to hold sufficient unsecured term
debt at the Topco level, in line with the TLAC proposals. Together, these
measures would facilitate an SPOE approach to resolution for large
European banks. As a byproduct, prescribing such a holding company
structure for banks would make cross-border resolution much easier in
E.U.-wide, transatlantic, and global situations.
Finally, we make a contribution to the current impasse around
funding of the centralized resolution mechanism. In our view, a specific
resolution fund, drawing from industry contributions, as currently proposed, is not sufficiently strong to be ultimately credible. We believe that
liquidity in a resolution situation in Europe needs to be provided by a
central bank; thus, the ECB could be tasked with providing liquidity for
the resolution process. The proposed resolution fund could then assume
the role of providing first-loss protection for the ECB.
Taken together, these measures would strengthen the current
Banking Union project, overcome political difficulties, and ensure a consistent approach to bank resolution across the Western world. This would
"enable large and complex cross-border firms to be resolved without
30 9
threatening financial stability and without putting public funds at risk."

309. FDIC & Bank of Eng., supra note 6, at ii.
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